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GRIDLAND: AN ALLEGORICAL CRITIQUE
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
ERIK LUNA*

Only in Wonderland.
1
- Scalia, J.
The world is broad and wide.
2
- A. Square
INTRODUCTION

It is no overstatement to say that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in United States v. Booker was one of the most widely anticipated cases in
years.3 Six months earlier,4 the Court had struck down a state sentencing
scheme that appeared virtually identical to the approach used in federal
courts, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines-a highly complex set of rules
promulgated by an administrative agency pursuant to congressional
legislation. The Guidelines dictate narrow ranges of punishment (e.g.,
forty-six to fifty-seven months imprisonment) based on the underlying
crime, the defendant's criminal history, and various factors considered by
the trial judge after conviction. With the specter that the federal regime was
now unconstitutional, cries of panic could be heard in the halls of Congress
and courthouses across the nation. Lawmakers claimed that "the criminal

* Hugh B. Brown Presidential Endowed Chair in Law and Professor of Law, University
of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. Many thanks to Douglas Berman, Stephanos Bibas,
Troy Booher, John Flynn, Daniel Medwed, Michael O'Hear, Alice Ristroph, and Stephen
Sady for their insightful comments.
I United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 793 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
2 EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND: A ROMANCE OF MANY DIMENSIONS 1 (HarperCollins

2001) (1884).
3 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
4 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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justice system has begun to run amok," 5 "crumbl[ing] the very foundation
of the Federal system of sentencing guidelines ' 6 and "threaten[ing] to clog
our Federal courts with procedural and constitutional nightmares." 7 Not to
be outdone, one government brief likened the situation to "Godzilla
rampaging through Tokyo during a level 10 earthquake," s while at oral
argument the U.S. Solicitor General referred to the "carnage and wreckage"
in the federal system. 9 Needless to say, much of the bench and bar held its
collective breath as the Justices deliberated.
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court issued a deeply divided
decision, producing two separate majority opinions, one on the merits and
the other on an appropriate remedy. In the first opinion, the Booker Court
held that the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by requiring postconviction judicial factfinding that could increase the potential punishment
for federal offenders.' 0 To solve this constitutional infirmity, the second
opinion excised a pair of statutory provisions, rendering the Guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory in a trial court's sentencing
determinations. 11 The public response to the decision was nearly
instantaneous, with some pundits and politicians expressing doom and
gloom,' 2 but many scholars taking a more tempered approach, recognizing
that the case "creates more questions than it answers."' 3 Most notably, the
federal courts must now decide on the level of deference to accord the
Guidelines at sentencing, from near-perfect compliance to total disregard,
as well as an assortment of appellate issues raised by the Supreme Court's
ruling. In turn, the first wave of Booker-related scholarship has delved into
the minutiae of the evolving Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, from the
5 Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
[hereinafter Hearingon FederalSentencing Guidelines].
6 Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
7 Id.at 6.
8 Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5, 5 (2005)
(quoting government brief).
9 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Show Inclination to Scrap Sentencing Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at A 14 (quoting Solicitor General Paul Clement during oral argument in
Booker).
10 Booker v. Washington, 125 S. Ct. 738, 748-56 (2005). But see infra note 179
(discussing "as-applied" versus "facial" challenge).
11Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 757-69.
12 See, e.g., Jerry Seper, High Court Voids 'Mandatory' Sentencing, WASH. TIMES,
Jan.
13, 2005, at Al (quoting a former prosecutor as saying "chaos will reign in federal
courthouses").
13Gina Holland, Supreme Court Orders Change in Federal Sentencing System,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 12, 2005 (quoting Prof. Douglas Berman).
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history and importance of the jury trial right to the doctrinal validity of the
Court's decision and its implications for the future,4 particularly how the
Guidelines regime might be saved and/or improved.1
All of this is important and commendable, but I have a somewhat
different perspective. Since their adoption, the Guidelines have undermined
the legitimacy of federal sentencing, largely preventing the exercise of
moral judgment by trial courts. The punishment process dehumanizes the
offense and offender by permitting consideration of only a few factors and
banning all others, mechanically inserting these variables into a sentencing
formula and then scoring punishment on a two-dimensional grid.
Moreover, the Guidelines' complexity can bewilder both professionals and
ordinary citizens, especially those concerned about a particular crime or
criminal, and the hypertechnical quality of the system generates punishment
discrepancies that are neither explicitly justified nor obviously justifiable.
Worse yet, the inflexibility of this regime has shifted sentencing authority
from trial courts to prosecutors through their exclusive power over charging
and plea decisions, while also inspiring judges and practitioners to collude
in a massive scheme to evade the Guidelines' rigid strictures. All told,
federal lawmakers and "a sort of junior-varsity Congress"1 5 created a
massive sentencing machine, cranking out a mechanical body of law
precluding the kind of moral judgment required of any legitimate system
deciding the fate of human beings. To me, at least, the Supreme Court's
most recent decision may provide an indirect opportunity to reconsider the
virtues of such an approach to punishment.
In his dissent in Booker, Justice Scalia lambasted part of the decision
as possible "[o]nly in Wonderland"' 6 -a literary analogy that, in fact, has
been used many times over the years in reference to federal sentencing,
with one judge arguing that "these guidelines go far too far" in creating a
surreal world "like Alice in Wonderland,"1 7 and another blasting a
particular sentence as conceivable "[o]nly in the world of Alice in
Wonderland, in which up is down and down is up, and words lose their real
14

See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54

EMORY

L.J.

377 (2005); Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395 (2005); David Yellen, Saving Federal
Sentencing Reform After Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REv. 163 (2005).
15 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
the U.S. Sentencing Commission).
16 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (attacking implied standard of
review adopted by remedial majority).
17 Joan Biskupic & Mary Pat Flaherty, Loss of Discretion Fuels Frustrationon Federal
Bench; Most District Judges Want Shift in Sentencing Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1996, at
A1 (quoting Judge Jon Newman) [hereinafter Biskupic & Flaherty, Loss of Discretion].
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meaning."' 8 I would like to offer another literary comparison, one that will
be less familiar to the legal profession but in the end, I believe, better fits
the problems inherent in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. It is the allegory
of Flatland,a witty depiction of a two-dimensional world that has some
striking similarities to the limited dimensionality of punishment in federal
courts.
Part I provides a brief synopsis of Flatland, its inhabitants, and its
rules. The article then suggests some troubling parallels between this
fictional realm and the very real domain of federal sentencing, a world that I
will call "Gridland." Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's opinions in
Booker and the lower court's recent interpretations, offering the possibility
that this landmark case and its progeny may indirectly challenge the twodimensional approach to punishment embodied in the Guidelines. Part III
argues, however, that the Guidelines' many problems may have been
moderated but not eliminated by Booker, as the language and practice of
formulaic sentencing still reign in U.S. district courts. Moreover, Part IV
suggests that it is yet to be seen whether Booker alleviates the fundamental
flaw in the Guidelines, the purging of moral judgment in punishment.
Finally, Part V provides some thoughts for the future of federal sentencing
in a world beyond Gridland.
I.

FLATLAND AND GRIDLAND

Written anonymously in 1884, Flatland: A Romance of Many
Dimensions has never gone out of print, with more than a dozen editions
currently in circulation. To this day, the book is "piled in heaps at the front
of the Harvard Coop"'19 and continues to inspire countless "sequels,
elaborations and imitations. '20 The originally unnamed author, Edwin A.
Abbott, was a serious scholar and theologian of the Victorian Age, the
headmaster of various British schools and an authority on Shakespeare,
Pope, and Bacon, as well as a popular nineteenth-century preacher and
18 United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 438 (1992) (Bright, J., dissenting).
19 Peter Renz, The World Is Broad and Wide: A Modern Mathematician Annotates a
Classic and Gives It Yet Another Dimension, SCI. AM., Apr. 30, 2002, at 89.
20 Edward Rothstein, Discovering Dimensions Beyond Imagining, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2001, at B9. Later works that were premised or would draw upon Flatlandinclude: DIONYS
BURGER, SPHERELAND: A FANTASY ABOUT CURVED SPACES AND AN EXPANDING UNIVERSE
(Thomas Y. Crowell 1965); A. K. DEWDNEY, THE PLANIVERSE (Poseidon Press 1984); C. H.
HINTON, AN EPISODE OF FLATLAND: OR, HOW A PLANE FOLK DISCOVERED THE THIRD
DIMENSION (Swan Sonnenscein & Co. Limited 1907); RUDY RUCKER, SPACELAND: A NOVEL
OF THE FOURTH DIMENSION (2002); RUDY RUCKER, THE FOURTH DIMENSION: A GUIDED TOUR
OF THE HIGHER UNIVERSES (1985); IAN STEWART, FLATTERLAND: LIKE FLATLAND, ONLY
MORE So (Perseus Publishing 2001); and JEFFREY R. WEEKS, THE SHAPE OF SPACE (1985).
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advocate for social reform.2 Although he penned Flatlandas a literaryjeu
d'esprit for his own amusement and that of his readers, Abbott presented an
engaging primer on geometry and a nearly painless initiation to the
concepts of dimensionality. 2 z Isaac Asimov notes that "it is probably the
23
best introduction one can find into the manner of perceiving dimensions,
while New York Times critic Edward Rothstein suggests that "it may be no
exaggeration to say [Flatland] has been read by24 every self-respecting
physicist, mathematician and science-fiction writer.
Yet few attorneys, jurists, and law professors have ever heard of the
monograph-length work (and until relatively recently, yours truly would
rank among the otherwise oblivious). This is a shame, not because there is
a need for legal professionals to bone up on their mathematics (which may
well be true 25), but because Flatland offers an evocative Swiftian
commentary on class hierarchy, orthodoxy, and hypocrisy, and implicitly
calls upon the reader to challenge accepted ideologies and mechanical
processes that have been handed down from generation to generation.
"Abbott's original intention was to give a portrait of transcendence, to show
how, through our imagination, we might be 'lifted' out of narrow
conceptions, ,,26 providing "a social satire that carries readers beyond
conventional ideas and surface appearances to an appreciation of new
worlds-those of higher-dimensional space.", 27 Approached with an open
legal mind, this sardonic allegory seems particularly pointed and fitting
when juxtaposed against any mechanistic, dehumanizing process, including
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
A. FLATLAND
Abbott's story begins with a description of "Flatland," a world that is,
quite literally, flat-a two-dimensional plane in the style of "a vast sheet of
paper"-populated by similarly flat but anthropomorphized geometric
figures.2 9 The thin dimensions of existence limit the inhabitant's perception
21

See, e.g., ABBOTT, supra note 2, at 121; Isaac Asimov, Foreword: Limitations to

ABBOTT, supra note 2; Renz, supra note 19, at 89; Rothstein, supra note 20, at vii.
22 See, e.g., Asimov, supra note 21, at vii.
23 Id.
24 Rothstein, supra note 20.
25 See, e.g., Stephen R. Sady, Misinterpretation of the Federal Good Time Statute Costs
PrisonersSeven Days Every Year, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 12 (analyzing systematic
miscalculation of "good time" credits for federal inmates).
26 Rothstein, supra note 20.
27 Renz, supra note 19, at 89.
28 ABBOTT, supra note 2, at 1.
29 Id.
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and mobility; there is no rising above or sinking below this planar world but
only observation and movement within the confines of its surface. As a
socio-political matter, the standing of each character is determined by the
number and regularity of his sides and angles. Isosceles triangles constitute
the lowest class of workers and soldiers, while equilateral triangles belong
to the slightly superior middle class. Professionals and gentlemen are,
respectively, squares and pentagons (for instance, the story's narrator-"A.
Square" 3 --is a square and, appropriately enough, a lawyer). Flatland's
nobility begins with hexagons, "and from thence rising in the number of
their sides till they receive the honourable title of Polygonal, or manysided., 31 The ruling class is composed of figures whose myriad sides have
become virtually indistinguishable from a circle, the ultimate geometric
figure in Flatland. The privileges of the circular class, who are held in the
highest esteem and deemed a "Priestly order" 32 infallible in word and deed,
can be contrasted to the lowly and precarious position of straight lines, the
women of this overtly misogynistic, Victorian-esque society. The life of
the feminine line is "truly deplorable," full of "miseries and humiliations, 33
and spoken of ... as being little better
all the while "they are both regarded
34
than 'mindless organisms.'

30

The name of Flatland's fictive narrator is a play on the author's own iterative last

name, Abbott Abbott. See Renz, supra note 19, at 89.
11ABBo-r, supra note 2, at 8.
32 Id. at 8.
" Id. at 18.
34 Id. at 59.
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35

Flatland'sMale Class Structure
DISTANT PAST

HIS FATHER

A. SQUARE

WORKERS
SOLDIERS
ISOSCELES

MIDDLE CLASS
EQUILATERAL

PROFESSIONAL

HIS SONS

HIS GRANDSONS

DISTANT FUTURE

GENTLEMEN

NOBILITY
HEXAGONS & UP

PRIESTLY
CIRCLES

Pursuant to Flatland's Constitution and the "Law of Nature," the
circles ruled society through the enactment and enforcement of strict and
often draconian dictates combined with cunning manipulation of the
geometric masses. For instance, ruthless restrictions on women arose from
claims of social necessity-namely, the danger posed by the lines' sharp
ends but allegedly dull wits-and even trivial violations could be punished
by death. 36 "There is peace, in so far as the absence of slaughter may be
called by that name," although "the cautious wisdom of the Circles has
ensured safety at the cost of domestic comfort. 3 7 Harsh penalties also
could befall those who questioned the very nature of Flatland or the
possibility of life beyond the two-dimensional. Investigations into the
origin of light (presumably from another dimension) were absolutely
prohibited, 38 while individuals who "profess[ed] to have received
revelations from another World" would be arrested and liable for
imprisonment or even execution. 39 Despite the harshness of the circular
35Design by Gregory Cahoone, based on Renz, supra note 19, at 89.
36 ABBOTT,

supra note 2, at 13.

7 Id.at 16-17.

8Id. at 5.

31See id.
at 96-97, 112.
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rulers and their rules, upheaval is kept to a minimum by the potential that
even a lowly isosceles or his offspring can achieve a better position, and in
some distant future attain polygonal nobility or priestly circularity. 40 "[A]ll
the higher classes are well aware that these rare phenomena, while they do
little or nothing to vulgarize their own privileges, serve as a most useful
barrier against revolution from below."41 In this way, "the Polygons and
Circles are almost always able to stifle sedition in its very cradle, taking
advantage
of the irrepressible and boundless hopefulness of the human
2
mind.

4

The ultimate value is uniformity, as decreed by the ruling class and
duly accepted by all else, "that every human being in Flatland is a Regular
Figure, that is to say of regular construction. 4 3 Women must be straight
lines, the working and middle classes must have two and three equal sides,
respectively, each side of a polygon must be of the same length, and so on.
Likewise, Flatland's "whole social system is based upon Regularity, or
Equality of Angles. 44 In contrast, geometric variation is considered "a
combination of moral obliquity and criminality"'' warranting social
reprobation and punishment. According to the leadership of the priestly
circles, any and all ills plaguing Flatland can be traced to "some deviation
from perfect Regularity. ' '46 As one heralded circle claimed, it is the
departure from the uniform, uneven sides and unequal angles, which should
be deplored rather than the character and deeds of the offending figure:
"[W]hy blame a lying, thievish Isosceles when you ought rather to deplore
the incurable inequality of his sides? ' 4 7

Treatment of divergence is

admittedly harsh, but apologists for the status quo suggest law and logic
demand that it be so. Regardless of the figure's plea of non-uniformity in
court, "the Magistrate cannot help sentencing him to be consumed-and
there's an end of the matter., 48 The circular hegemony supporting the
"Irregular Penal Laws" is even parroted by the story's ostensibly
progressive narrator: "I for my part have never known an Irregular who was
not also what Nature evidently intended him to be-a hypocrite, a

40 See Figure 1 ("Flatland's Male Class Structure").
41 ABBOTT,
42

supra note 2, at 10.

Id. at 10-11. See generally id.at 8-11.

41 Id. at 32.

4 Id.at 33.
45Id. at 34; see also id. at 23.
46 Id. at 54.
47 Id. at 55.
48

id.
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misanthropist,49 and, up to the limits of his power, a perpetrator of all manner
of mischief.,
As it turns out, however, recognition of individuals and thus the
assessment of regularity prove difficult in a two-dimensional world. Those
who live "in the happy region of the Three Dimensions ... are blessed with
shade as well as light [and] endowed with a knowledge of perspective"but all Flatlanders, "no matter what their form, present to our view the
same, or nearly the same, appearance, viz. that of a straight Line." 50 For
women and the lower classes, "feeling" is the primary means of
recognition, touching others to understand their configuration.5 1 This
manner seems to comport with the values and sentiments of the feminine
lines-"love," "duty," "right," "wrong," "pity," "hope," et cetera-all of
which are considered to be "irrational and emotional conceptions, which
have no existence. 2 The higher classes readily dismiss such notions,
while "feeling" is strongly disapproved or altogether prohibited.53 Instead,
the endorsed method of recognition is by "sight" or, more accurately, the
ability to infer another's figure, a capacity that requires years of training
and experience.5
Circular dogma to the contrary, the stringent demands of regularity
coupled with the limits of visual recognition make the process hard to
master, let alone justify. At times, the slightest differences in degree of
angle or length of side have life-changing consequences for the average
Flatlanders. A. Square relates the story of his 59O30 ' ancestor, aspiring to
the equilateral, whose "family brain was registered at only 580, and not till
the lapse of five generations was the lost ground recovered, the full 60'
attained, and the Ascent from the Isosceles finally achieved., 55 This
rigidity of rules seems particularly troubling given the imprecision of
assessment. For instance, the narrator is "a Mathematician of no mean
standing," yet he admits difficulty in discriminating among "a crowd of
rotating Polygons," and such a sight would be "unintelligible . . . to a
common Tradesman, or Serf.",56 In turn, members of the highest classes
have been known to carouse with or even marry non-uniform lines, 57 while

" Id. at 35.
50 Id. at 18; see also id. at 1-3.
" Id. at 19-20.
52 Id. at 58.
13 See id. at 30, 58-59.
14 Id. at 30.
55 Id. at 22.
56 Id. at 28-29.
" See id at 56-58.
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"many of the highest Circles, sitting as Judges in law courts, use praise and
blame towards Regular and Irregular Figures" and "speak about 'right' or
'wrong' as vehemently and passionately as if they believed that these names
represented real existence., 58 What is more, there are those who argue that
rehabilitation is possible and that context matters, especially for the
irregular figure "scorned and suspected by society ...excluded from all
activity [and h]is every movement.
posts of responsibility, trust, and useful
59
.jealously watched by the police.,
In fact, there was a time in Flatland without rules demanding
uniformity, when differences were respected rather than punished. During
"the space of half a dozen centuries or more," when the "Ancient Practice
with various
of Painting" flourished, individuals decorated themselves
60
recognition.
personal
and
distinction
of
colors as a matter
Immoral, licentious, anarchical, unscientific--call them by what names you
will-yet, from an aesthetic point of view, those ancient days of the Colour Revolt
were the glorious childhood of Art in Flatland-a childhood, alas, that never ripened

into manhood, nor even reached the blossom of youth. To live was then in itself a
delight, because living implied seeing.
...The commonest utterances of the commonest citizens in the time of the
Colour Revolt seem to have been suffused with a richer tinge of word or thought; and

to that era we are even now indebted for our finest poetry and for
61 whatever rhythm
still remains in the more scientific utterance of these modem days.
But appreciating the danger to the higher classes-with color allegedly
leading "the common people into endless mistakes" and posing the "total
destruction of all Aristocratic Legislature and . ..the subversion of our
Privileged Classes" 6 2-the Chief Circle delivered a rabblerousing speech
against the practice of painting. "With the universal adoption of Colour,"
he declared, "all distinctions would cease; Regularity would be confused
with Irregularity; development would give place to retrogression . . . [;]
fraud, deception, hypocrisy would pervade every household; domestic bliss
would share the fate of the Constitution and pass to speedy perdition. 6 3
From that day forward, color was abolished, its possession banned, and
even words alluding to color subject to punishment. 64 Through the power
of political histrionics, colorization and non-uniformity of configuration are
Ild. at 55-56.
9 Id. at 34-35.
See id. at 36.
61 Id. at 38-39.
62 Id. at 43-44.
63 Id.at 47-48.
60

64 Id.at 49.
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thus prohibited in Flatland, for if they were allowed, "civilization would
relapse into barbarism" 65-- or so the official rhetoric suggests.
B. GRIDLAND
The world of federal sentencing is not altogether different from
Flatland, and thus when referring to the realm of punishment in federal
courts, I will call it "Gridland," not because defendants and criminal justice
actors refer to it as such, "but to make its nature clearer to you, my happy
readers, who are privileged to live

'66

outside of its boundaries. The laws of

Gridland, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, provide the rules for punishing
convicted federal offenders. Once a defendant has been found guilty at trial
(or by plea agreement), the U.S. district court must determine punishment
under the Guidelines, a determination that is often predetermined or
overdetermined but certainly not undetermined, as the federal sentencing
scheme is "determinate" (i.e., mandatory). For those who know nothing of
Gridland, it might seem Orwellian to label the regime guidelines"recommendations or principles for determining a course of action ''67 since trial courts were required to follow these dictates or be reversed on
appeal.6 8 But in Gridland, the Guidelines need not be "guidelines," at least
as that term is understood throughout the rest of the known universe.
The Guidelines supposedly set down a sentence for every case through
exhaustive rules contained in the "Guidelines Manual," a document that has
ballooned to some 1,500 pages of regulations marked as "Guidelines,"
"Policy Statements," and "Commentary," and packed with examples, crossreferences, and amendments. Using the rules of this tome, the trial judge
must first establish which of forty-three categories applies to the crime in
question, setting the "base offense level" for sentencing a particular
defendant. The judge then determines which of six "criminal history"
categories governs the defendant given his prior record of offending. With
these details, the judge will refer to the "Sentencing Table," a twodimensional grid of offense levels and criminal history scores, forming 258
boxes of punishment for all possible offenses and offenders.6 9 The
61
66

Id. at 32.
Id. at 1.

67 MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 555 (1 1th ed. 2003).

68As Michael Tonry quipped, the U.S. Sentencing Commission made a "Freudian slip"
of sorts by calling the Guidelines "mandatory." MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 83
(1996) [hereinafter TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS]; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,

ANN. REP. 1 (1990); ef Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the US.
Sentencing Commission's "Mandatory Guidelines," 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 129 (1991)
[hereinafter Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties].
69 See Figure 2 ("The Grid").
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appropriate range might be adjusted by aggravating circumstances, such as
the defendant's brandishing of a weapon, or mitigating circumstances, such
70
as the defendant's accepting responsibility for his criminal misconduct.
Nonetheless, each range is capped at 25 percent of the maximum sentence,7'
with some ranges cutting tighter than this outer limit.72 So in sum: score the
crime and the criminal record, find them on the all-encompassing matrix of
Gridland, make any permitted adjustments, pull the handle, and there's your
punishment.

70

The process can be quite complex and generates both confusion and error. See text

accompanying notes 86-92. For an excellent primer on federal sentencing procedures under
the Guidelines, see LUCIEN B. CAMPBELL & HENRY J. BEMPORAD, FEDERAL PUBLIC AND
COMMUNITY DEFENDERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL GUIDELINES SENTENCING (5th ed.
2001).
71 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1993).
72 For instance, a first-time criminal who commits a level 18 offense (e.g., extortion by
force) must be sentenced to between twenty-seven and thirty-three months in federal prison,
a range of a mere 18 percent. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.2 (2004).
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Figure 2
"The Grid"
SENTENCING TABLE (in months of imprisonment)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
V
111
IV
11
(13
(7,8,9)
(10, 11, 12)
(2 or 3)
(4,5,6)
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
2-8
0-6
0-6

VI
or more)

Offense
Level

1
(0 or 1)

1
2
3

0-6
0-6
0-6

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16

0-6
0-6
1-7
2-8
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16
12-18

0-6
1-7
2-8
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16
12-18
15-21

2-8
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27

4-10
6-12
9-15
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33

6-12
9-15
12-18
15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37

13
14
15

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

18-24
21-27
24-30

24-30
27-33
30-37

30-37
33-41
37-46

33-41
37-46
41-51

16
17
18
19
20
21

21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46

24-30
27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51

27-33
30-37
33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57

33-41
37-46
41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71

41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87

46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
77-96

22
23
24
25
26
27

41-51
46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87

46-57
51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97

51-63
57-71
63-78
70-87
78-97
87-108

63-78
70-87
77-96
84-105
92-115
10Ce125

77-96
84-105
92-115
100-125
110-137
120-150

84-105
92-115
100-125
110-137
120-150
130-162

28
29
30
31
32
33

78-97
87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168

87-108
97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168
151-188

97-121
108-135
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210

110-137
121-151
135-168
151-188
168-210
188-235

130-162
140-175
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262

140-175
151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293

34
35
36
37
38
39

151-188
168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327

168-210
188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365

188-235
210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405

210-262
235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life

235-293
262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life

262-327
292-365
324-405
360-life
360-life
360-life

40
41
42
43

292-365
324-405
360-life
life

324-405
360-life
360-life
life

360-life
360-Te
360-life
life

360-life
360-life
360-life
life

360-life
360-life
360-life
life

360-life
360-life
360-life
life

0-6
1-7
3-9

37
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Similar to the idiom of Flatland's ruling class, punishment in federal
courts is largely bereft of words such as "right," "wrong," "pity," and
"hope," and instead is marked by a technical language---"base levels,"
"categories," "points," "scores," and so on-that resonates like the jargon
of actuaries or tax accountants, or maybe players in a parlor game. 73 A
sentence will thus sound something like this:
For a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, USSG § 2FL.1(a) calls for a base offense level of
six (6). Pursuant to USSG § 2F1.l(b)(l)(l)-(J), eight (8) levels are added because the
loss amount was more than $200,000 but less than $350,000. Pursuant to USSG §
2FI.I(b)(2)(A), two (2) levels are added because the offense involved more than
minimal planning. Pursuant to USSG § 3BL.3, two (2) levels are added because
Stevenson abused a position of trust (bookkeeper) that involved minimal supervision
and sole responsibility for the daily finances of her employer. . . . Stevenson's
adjusted offense level (subtotal) is eighteen (18). With the Government's consent to
the application of USSG § 3El.l(a), the offense level is reduced by two (2) for
acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, Stevenson's total offense level is sixteen
(16). Stevenson's criminal history score is ten (10). At the time of the instant
offense, Stevenson was on probation for arrests of October 17, 1992 and April 5,
1993. Thus, pursuant to USSG § 4Al.l(d), two (2) points are added, bringing her
total criminal history score to twelve (12). For criminal history points of 10, 11 or 12,
the sentencing table at USSG Chapter 5, Part A, establishes a criminal history
category of V. With an offense level of 16 and criminal history score of 10, the
a Guideline range for imprisonment of forty-one (41) to
sentencing table provides
74
fifty-one (51) months.

Voila! A human being has been transformed from a multidimensional
being into a string of letters and numbers, cast onto the grid of Gridland for
internment in a federal penitentiary. The defendant is now a twodimensional character-as flat as any in Flatland-his vertical axis an
73 See, e.g., Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Despite Overhaul, Federal Sentencing
Still Misfires, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at Al (quoting judge that "[p]eople think of it as a
game, like Parcheesi") [hereinafter Flaherty & Biskupic, Despite Overhaul]; Marc Miller,
True Grid. Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 587, 588 n.4. (1992) ("The
table looks like the board for the game of 'GO."').
74 United States v. Stevenson, 325 F. Supp. 2d 543, 545-46 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see also
Flaherty & Biskupic, Despite Overhaul,supra note 73 (quoting federal sentencing colloquy):
The court finds that the base offense level is 20 ....

Pursuant to Guideline 2K2.13(B)(4), the

offense level is increased by two levels [to 22]. ... The court notes that the criminal convictions
..result in a total criminal history category score of 18. At the time of the instant offense ...
the defendant was serving a parole sentence in two causes of action. And pursuant to Sentencing
Guidelines 4A 1.1 (D), 2 points are therefore added. The total criminal history points are 20. And
according to the sentencing guidelines Chapter 5, Part A, 20 criminal history points establish a
criminal history category of 6.... [As a result] the guideline range for imprisonment is 84 to 105
months.
See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, No. IP 03-122-CR H/F, 2003 WL 23220736, at *5-6

(S.D. Ind. 2003).
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offense level and his horizontal axis a criminal history category. There is
no depth or detail, no shading or perspective, only an initial movement
within the grid pursuant to points or levels duly added or subtracted, placing
him within a narrow range of punishment. The Guidelines are "neutral"
with regard to the offender's race, sex, national origin, and creed,75 a
restriction that seems eminently reasonable in both Gridland and worlds of
higher dimensionality. But federal judges cannot consider an assortment of
issues deemed significant in lands not wholly defined by the x-y axes,
including the defendant's: age, education, vocational skills, mental and
emotional condition, physical condition, drug or alcohol dependence, lack
of guidance as a youth, employment history, family ties and responsibilities,
community ties, military and public service, and charitable works.76
Under the Guidelines, judges thus confront defendants as numbers
rather than as human beings. The Guidelines sought "a fully rationalized
algebra of criminology and penology" that eliminates discretion in
sentencing, 77 a sort of "sentencing machine," where the court inserts the
necessary figures to calculate a set punishment.7 8 The result is "sentencing
by the numbers," converting a trial judge into an "automaton," "rubberstamp bureaucrat," "notary public," or "accountant, ' 79 whose role is
reduced to "filling in the blanks and applying a rigid, mechanical
formula., 80 As such, federal sentencing purges much of the human element
" 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1993).

76 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, §§ 5H1.1-.6, 5H1.11-.12.

But see, e.g., United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that
although "[t]he Guidelines purport to prohibit sex from being taken into account in the
determination of a sentence" "[n]o mention is made of sexual orientation" and then granting
downward departure to homosexual defendants because they would be "especially
vulnerable to abuse in prison given their sexual orientation" ); cf infra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text (discussing covert evasion of the Guidelines).
77 Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 366 (1992).
78 TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS, supra note 68, at 98 (quoting ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET
AL., RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 159 (1983)); see also KATE STITH
& JOst A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

84 (1998) (arguing that "the Guidelines threaten to transform the venerable ritual of
sentencing into a puppet theater").
79 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at 169; Conference on the FederalSentencing
Guidelines. Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2054 (1992) (comments of Judge
Edward Becker); Frank Gilbert, The Probation Officer's Perception of the Allocation of
Discretion, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 109, 109 (1991); Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, Some
Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1291, 1293-94 (1986);
Weinstein, supra note 77, at 364; Josd A. Cabranes, A Failed Utopian Experiment, NAT'L
L.J., July 27, 1992, at 17.
80 United States v. Russell, 685 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1988); see also United
States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[S]entencing has been relegated to a
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in order to make defendants fit within the limited dimensions of Gridland.
The cookie-cutter approach of the Guidelines creates all-purpose categories
of crimes and criminals, privileging certain factors and ignoring all others,
thereby transforming specific cases involving unique individuals into
uniform patterns amenable to the grid.
It is hard not to sense a "certain Kafkaesque aura" 8' about the entire
process, lopping off the defendant's individuating traits and mechanically
evaluating the remainder-clumps of data, plugged into the sentencing
equation and then charted on a two-dimensional matrix. In Gridland, you
might expect that one federal inmate would say to another, "I'm an offense
level 17, criminal history category 3, with a range of 30-37 months-what
are you?" Or maybe you might overhear a federal judge lamenting to a
colleague, "It was one § 5Kl.1 after another,8 2 then hearings filled with §
1B1.3 evidence,83 plus an irate category VI in the afternoon. But at' 85least a
4
couple showed heartfelt § 3El.1,1 and there were no § 2Al's today.
Such exchanges do not occur (as far as I know), although possibly due
to the inscrutable nature of the Guidelines rather than the stilted character of
this dialogue alone. The rules are at best puzzling in their hypertechnical
variations and at worst a foreign dialect to lay participants, particularly the
individual most directly affected by this cryptic language--Gridland's
newest resident, the defendant at sentencing. Court hearings on punishment
are "nearly unintelligible to victims, defendants, and observers, and even to
the very lawyers and judges involved in the proceeding., 86 Widespread
difficulties were encountered in implementing the hypertechnical
sentencing system-one that is under constant amendment and subject to a
vast body of jurisprudence-spurring publications, conferences, courses,
and the like, all to steer otherwise perfectly competent people through the

somewhat mechanical process."); United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121, 1163 (S.D. Fla.
1988) (Aronovitz, J., concurring) (describing federal sentencing as a "mechanistic

administrative formula").
0. Thomas Esele, The Sentencing Guidelines System? No. Sentencing Guidelines?
Yes., FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at 16, 20.
82 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, § 5Kl.1 (sentence
departures based on substantial assistance of defendant).
83 Id. § 1B1.3 (relevant conduct of defendant).
84 Id. § 3El.1 (acceptance of responsibility).
85 Id. § 2A1 (homicide).
86 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at 5; see, e.g., Mary Pat Flaherty, Innocent Errors
81

Add Years to Terms of Guilty Parties,WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at A21 (quoting Judge John
Rhodes).
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Among other things, the
puzzling rules of federal sentencing.87
Commission established an "Office of Education and Sentencing Practice"
to tutor the many baffled professionals, and it even created a series of
punishment calculation worksheets (bearing a vague resemblance to an
I.R.S. form).88
At the outset, Gridland's maniacal rules virtually guaranteed errors in
sentencing, from simple mathematical mistakes to using incorrect editions
of the Guidelines Manual, at times producing multi-year punishment
blunders.8 9 But even when a sentence was arithmetically correct, the people
immediately impacted by the punishment-particularly the newly gridded
defendant-would exit the hearing mystified by the process and rationale
for the ultimate judgment. Guidelines sentences can vary widely based on
seemingly trivial distinctions with marginal cognitive impact,
distinguishing between "minor" and "minimal" participation in the offense,
for instance, and between "leadership" and "managerial" roles. 90 Likewise,
relatively small variations in the amount of money in question or the
quantity (and even form) of a given contraband can produce astounding
discrepancies in punishment. 9 1 As is now infamous, convert cocaine for
sniffing (powder) to cocaine for smoking (crack) and the punishment
increases 100 fold, despite the lack of any significant pharmacological or
penological distinction.92 But in Gridland, at least, differences need not be
intellectually meaningful to have enormous significance.
87

See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 86 (mentioning telephone hotlines to guide attorneys

and probation officers through the Guidelines); United States Sentencing Commission,
About Guideline Training & Education, http://www.ussc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
88 See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guideline Worksheets,
availableat http://www.ussc.gov/training/workshee.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).

89 See, e.g., TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS, supra note 68, at 98-99; Flaherty, supra note

86.

90See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, §§ 3B1.1-.2.

91 Such discrepancies are well-documented, beginning with Paul H. Robinson, Dissent
from the United States Sentencing Commission's Proposed Guidelines, 77 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1112 (1986).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Dumas, 64 F.3d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995) (Boochever, J.,
concurring); United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J.,
concurring); United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994); United States v.
Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1994); United States v. Maske, 840 F. Supp. 151, 155
(D.D.C. 1993); United States v. Patillo, 817 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Douglas A.
Berman, Rethinking the Crack Cocaine Ratio, 10 FED. SENT'G REP. 179 (1998); Frank 0.
Bowman, II1,The Geology of Drug Policy in 2002, 14 FED. SENT'G REP. 123 (2002); David
A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection,47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995); William
Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38
ARIz. L. REV. 1233, 1249 (1996); see infra note 237 (discussing post-Booker crack cocaine
cases).
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So unlike judges drawn from the highest class of circles in Flatland,
those who work in the grid seem comparable to the middle class equilateral
or possibly a professional square, but certainly not the polygonal nobility.
Criminal defendants, in turn, would rank no higher than the lowly isosceles
or even the (presumably) mindless lines, although flat fodder for the
sentencing machine might be more fitting. But like the centuries of color in
Flatland, there was a time when federal sentencing was an art, not a pseudoscience, when the specifics of an offense and offender mattered, when
context and perspective were taken into account rather than expressly
Throughout most of American history, punishment was
ignored.
"indeterminate" in nature, with lawmakers broadly defining criminal
offenses and potential punishments while judges deliberated on the
comparative seriousness of a specific crime and an appropriate sentence for
the offender. "Traditionally," noted the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993,
"sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to
evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose on a
convicted defendant." 93 This eclectic approach attempted to accommodate
the diverse rationales for punishment, from retributive principles of "just
deserts" to consequential considerations of deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation, thus allowing trial judges to craft a proper sentence based on
an array of factors and legitimate conceptions of justice.9 4
In fact, federal sentencing was indeterminate through most of the
previous century, supposedly in accordance with the rehabilitative idealshaping the sentence to the offender in order to "cure" his "disease" of
criminality (or effectively quarantine him from lawful society), thereby
thwarting future crimes. Various officials played a role in this model:
Federal probation officers gathered details about the defendant's personal
history and criminal record, presenting some insight into his capacity to
reform and remain law-abiding, while the official release date would be set
by parole authorities based on their own judgment of the inmate's likely
behavior in society. But as always, trial court judges retained primary
control over punishment, as Congress had established only maximum
prison terms for most federal offenses, thus giving district courts the
discretion to impose sentences below that limit. 95 Such an approach is not
without its problems, however. Trial judges did not have to offer reasons
93 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993).
94 See infra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (1982) (repealed by Pub. L. 98-473, § 218(a)(5), 98
Stat. 2027); see also Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons
from Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 419, 422 (1999). But see infra
notes 240-44 and accompanying text (discussing history of mandatory minimums sentences).
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for any particular sentence, their decisions were largely immune from
appeal, and there was no formal means to consider the distribution and
96
fairness of punishment among cases. Across the ideological spectrum, 9 7
professionals and politicians began to view the system as "lawless,
producing unacceptable sentencing disparities among defendants.
Judicial arbitrariness was so widespread, conventional wisdom
scoffed, that punishment in any given case depended upon a sort of
"breakfast" rule--"what the judge had for breakfast." 98 As lampooned by
former U.S. Sentencing Commissioner Michael Goldsmith:
Certain culinary items suggested light sentences geared towards rehabilitation (eggs
over easy, instant oatmeal, Sweet 'N Low, Lucky Charms, and Cheerios). However,
others evoked harsher images of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation (hard
boiled eggs, bacon extra crisp, and especially Total, Life, or any type of toast). Of
course, if the judge had99 dined on waffles or Fruit Loops (as often seemed to be the
case), all bets were off.

Although the historical accuracy of vastly discrepant sentences can be
debated,' 00 the powerful imagery of arbitrary decisionmaking dominated
most discussion about sentencing in the 1970s and early 1980s.10' One of
the leading advocates for reform, Judge Marvin Frankel, pilloried the
federal system for its "unruliness, the absence of rational ordering, the
unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory."' 0 2 To
deal with this "terrifying and intolerable" condition, 10 3 Judge Frankel
proposed "a commission on sentencing"' 0 4 to design rules that would guide
96 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, CATO
POL'Y ANALYSIS, Nov. 1, 2002, at 4-5 [hereinafter Luna, Misguided Guidelines] (discussing
convergence of opinion against indeterminate punishment and odd political coalition that
produced the Sentencing Reform Act).
97 See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973);
Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing,41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1972).
98 MICHAEL GOLDSMITH & JAMES GIBSON, NYU LAW SCH. CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN CRIME

& JUSTICE, THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A SURPRISING SUCCESS? I (1999).
99 Id; see also William T. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, ProsecutorialDiscretion Under
the FederalSentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guardingthe Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REv.
373, 379 (1995) (discussing image of judges as either "turn 'em loose Bruce" or "hang 'em
high Hary").
100 See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at 105-42.
101See, e.g., United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (D.N.D. 2003) ("Before
the Guidelines, district courts enjoyed almost unbridled discretion in sentencing. This
unbridled discretion led to a wide disparity in sentencing whereas similarly situated
defendants received wildly different sentences depending on the temperament of the
sentencing judge.").
102 See FRANKEL, supra note 97, at 49.

'0' Id. at 5.
114 Id at 118-24.
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trial judges in their punishment decisions, such as a "detailed profile or
checklist of factors that would include, wherever possible, some form of
numerical or other objective grading."' 0 5 A "chart or calculus" would then
be employed "by the sentencing judge in weighing the many elements that
go into a sentence."' 1 6 Frankel's fantasy was of a mechanical jurisprudence
that reduced judicial discretion through an efficient and comprehensive set
0 7
of rules that could eliminate most individualized decisionmaking.1
Whether he knew it or not, Frankel was dreaming of Gridland.
Some two decades ago, this vision became a reality with the passage of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.08 Echoing the statements of Frankel
and others, Congress demonstrated a supreme suspicion and even fear of
judges. "The present problem with disparity in sentencing," argued one
senator, "stems precisely from the failure of federal judges ....

There is

little reason to believe that judges will now begin to do what they have
failed to do in the past."' 0 9 A dissenting senator paraphrased the debate as
"judges cannot be trusted. You cannot trust a judge.., you must not trust a
judge." 0 The legislative history materialized in parts as a calumnious rant
against the courts, that judges were the problem and needed to be severely
disciplined."' (All that seemed to be missing was a floor tirade from Rep.
Elmer Fudd about those "wascawwy wabbits.") Given the dubious premise
of the Sentencing Reform Act, it is not altogether surprising that the
legislation introduced a lengthy, potentially conflicting list of targets and
constraints, 12 with the "first and foremost goal" of eliminating disparity by

1"' Id. at 113.
106

Id. at 115.

07 See infra Part V.A (discussing mechanical jurisprudence).
los Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
09 130 CONG. REC. 976 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Laxalt).

o10
Id. at 973 (remarks of Sen. Mathias paraphrasing position of Act's supporters). See
generally S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong. (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
111See, e.g., Jonathan Chiu, United States v. Booker: The Demise of Mandatory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Return of Indeterminate Sentencing, 39 U. RICH. L. REV.
1311, 1345 (2005); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 223,
278-80 (1993).
112 The system was supposed to: promote respect for the law; provide a clear statement of
the purposes of punishment and the types/lengths of sentences; ensure that the defendant,
officials, and the public "are certain about the sentence and the reasons for it"; meet the
demands of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; offer trial judges "a
full range of sentencing options from which to select the most appropriate sentence in a
particular case"; and end "unwarranted sentence disparities" between otherwise similarly
situated criminals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong. 39 (1983),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222.
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Toward this objective,
requiring uniformity in punishment."3
indeterminate sentencing in the federal system was brought to an end,
eliminating parole and compelling judges to fix an exact sentence (less a
small discount for good behavior in prison) that could be reviewed on
appeal. The Act also fulfilled Judge Frankel's dream of an agency on
punishment, launching an "independent commission in the judicial branch,"
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, to create and disseminate guidelines that
reined in judicial discretion through relatively tight ranges of punishment. 14
The Commission had only eighteen months to complete its
assignment, one that was hindered by the sometimes muddled legislative
directives, as well as internal disagreement over the importance and
function of punishment theory-all while outside detractors were berating
the project as foolhardy and unconstitutional. The resulting work product,
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, could not help but be warped by the time
limit, uncertainties of language, disagreement over philosophy, and an illconceived institutional process. For instance, the commissioners clashed
over the appropriate model-one focused on utilitarian "crime control" or
another linked to retributive assessments of harm-and with time running
out, the Commission decided not to decide, resolving that the Guidelines
would not adopt any theory of punishment but instead would rely upon a
statistical review of past sentences. Yet for whatever reason, 1 5 the
Guidelines adopted a hyperdeterministic, incremental-harm approach that
no sane theory demands-generating significant swings in punishment with
seemingly trivial changes in fact' 16 -- and in so doing, the system discarded
the historical wisdom of theoretically eclectic, context-sensitive
punishment. As for the empirically guided assessment of punishment, the
Guidelines simply increased the average sentences across-the-board, with a
sizeable escalation for white-collar and drug crimes. 1 7 Likewise, violent
113 Kenneth

R. Feinberg, FederalCriminalSentencing Reform: Congress and the United

States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 295-96 (1993); see also 133
CONG. REC. 33109 (1987) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); id. at 33110 (remarks of Sen. Biden);
Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective
SentencingSystem, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 187 (1993).
114 28

U.S.C. § 991 (2000). By statute, the Commission included two ex officio members
and seven voting members, with three sitting federal judges and no more than four
individuals from the same party. Id. § 99 1(a).
115 See Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 96, at 25 n.50 (mentioning a potential
explanation for the Guidelines methodology).
116 See Robinson, supra note 91.
117 Under the Guidelines, nominal sentences increased on average by nearly 80% (from
twenty-eight months to fifty months), and actual time served rose by 230% (from thirteen
months to forty-three months). STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at 63. A large amount of
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offenses received boosts in punishment "where the Commission was
convinced that they were inadequate," although it failed to detail exactly
what made a sentence "inadequate" and why18 the Commission was
"convinced" of such deficiency for a given crime.
All of this was possible because the Commission was uninhibited by
the usual restrictions imposed on administrative agencies: it was not bound
by standardized procedures for evaluating new rules; it was not required to
deliberate in an open forum or provide rationales for any new rules; and its
work product was not subject to appellate review.119 The Commission
could just issue a set of "diktats"' 120 that command specific consequences in
sentencing and, as mentioned earlier, prohibit trial judges from considering
facts about the offcnder that may appear highly relevant in fixing
punishment.' 21 In the language of Flatland, the Commissioners are
infallible priestly circles that reign over the grid and the wily judges of
federal sentencing. Over the years, only the will of Congress has received
deference in structuring the laws of Gridland. For example, legislators
would occasionally send the Commission "directives" for new rules, which
were inevitably adopted12 2-after all, federal lawmakers deserve the respect
due fellow members of the circular class. Congress has also passed
the increase stems from the elimination of parole, limits on probation, and the creation of
new mandatory minimum sentences, especially for drug and gun offenses. See, e.g., infra
notes 237-74 and accompanying text.
I" U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING

GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 19 (1987).

119See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong. 149, 180-81 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3332, 3363-64; United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991); STITH
& CABRANES, supra note 78, at 40, 56-57, 95.
120 United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (D. Mass. 2005); STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 78, at 95.
121 So-called "downward departures" provided the official (and in most cases, the only)
mechanism for reducing a sentence from the otherwise predetermined Guidelines range.
Other than cooperating with the government and obtaining a "substantial assistance"
departure at the prosecutor's request, the only basis for lowering a sentence was a trial judge
finding a factor "not adequately taken into consideration" by the Commission and thus
requiring a different sentence than imposed by the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
Unfortunately, this "heartland" concept was not warmly received by the Commission or the
appellate courts, and as a result, the idea of departures on this basis has been all but
foreclosed. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2005); see, e.g., United States v.
Weinberger, 91 F.3d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Given the comprehensive sentencing
structure embodied in the guidelines, '[o]nly rarely will we conclude that a factor was not
adequately taken into consideration by the Commission.') (citation omitted); see also Luna,
Misguided Guidelines, supra note 96, at 28 n.92.
122 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal
Sentencing Policy; or, Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv.
1001, 1022-25 (2001); see also Jaber,362 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
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sentences that compel increases in the applicable
mandatory minimum 23
ranges of punishment. 1
Of late, however, federal lawmakers have intensified their campaign
against the judiciary, including the passage of the so-called Feeney
Amendment, a gratuitous legislative rider log-rolled within the otherwise
laudable "Amber Alert" bill. 2 4 The relevant provisions all but eliminated
judicial discretion to craft an appropriate sentence below the guidelines
range; the Amendment abolished appellate court deference to the
sentencing decisions of trial judges, expressly overruling the U.S. Supreme
Court's one sensible decision in this area;12 and it created a congressional
"blacklist"'' 26 of those judges who make downward departures without the
approval of federal prosecutors. According to the sponsor, Rep. Tom
Feeney, the rationale for these and other changes was the "long-standing
and increasing problems of downward departures [i.e., sentence
reductions]" by district court judges. 2 7 On the law enforcement side, thenU.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft praised Congress for "clos[ing] the
loopholes on sentencing criminals," as "too many have found their way
back on the streets because some federal judges have exploited loopholes in
the sentencing guidelines.' 2 8 Although the facts could not bear out these

123

Some respected commentators have attempted to differentiate the Guidelines from

mandatory minimum. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN L. REV.
1017 (2004). But each device prescribes strict parameters for punishment-and when
Congress creates a new mandatory minimum, the applicable sentencing range just shifts
upward in accord with the legislation. As such, both the Guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentences are examples of the same phenomenon: mandatory, hyper-determinate
punishment.
124 PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
125 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
126 See, e.g., Editorial, BlacklistingJudges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 10; lan
Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2003, at BI; see also United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262 (D. Mass. 2004);
United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1167 (D. Or. 2004). But see United States
v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 2003) (Cassell, J.) (concluding, inter alia, that
the Feeney Amendment did not eliminate judicial discretion and that the so-called "black
list" provision was legally irrelevant).
127 149 CONG. REC. H2422 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney).
128 Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Milwaukee, Wis., Sept. 22, 2003,
quoted in Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1254 (2004); see also Tom Perrotta, Foes of Limits on Sentence
Departures Make Headway, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 10, 2003, at 4 (quoting D.O.J. spokesperson)
("The Feeney amendment enacts long-overdue reforms to address the longstanding, and stillgrowing, problem of downward departures from the Sentencing Commission's Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.").
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claims, 129 trifling things like accuracy do not worry infallible politicians,
particularly when scolding federal judges. "They are a child of Congress,
whether they like it or not," Feeney chided. "If we wanted to, we could give
judges no discretion whatsoever in sentencing."'1 30 So there!
Of course, it doesn't really matter whether lawmakers or
commissioners ultimately rule the grid. To the extent that punishment is
predetermined by Congress or the Commission, a remote entity is judging
an individual without sufficient knowledge of the people or events in
question. Distant bodies can only deliver cookie-cutter justice based on
generalities, creating uniformity without humanity. But that is all that can
be seen in a two-dimensional world like Gridland.

II. "OTHER WORLDS"' 31 : UNITED STATES V.BOOKER
Despite all efforts by those in power, it proved impossible to
hermetically seal the borders of either Flatland or Gridland from contact
with outside affairs, benevolent, malevolent, or something in between. As
previously noted, the ruling class of Flatland recognized the "mysterious
problem" of the origin of light and the recurring claims of "revelations from
another World," but the consistent response was to reject the existence of
any crisis and punish those who dared question the circular resolution of
flat denial. 32 The rulers "are not only incapable of understanding the
limitations of their view but are enraged by any attempt to enforce them to
transcend those limitations."'' 33
This obstinacy and the supporting
hegemonic structure presented the greatest challenge for those who wished
to see the bigger picture extending past the two-dimensional, including
narrator A. Square.
129 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2003); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES: DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL YEARS 1999-2001 (2003); Gary Fields & Jess Bravin, Federal

Judges Aren't as Lenient as Lawmakers Say, Studies Show, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2003, at
A4; see also Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the Am. Bar Ass'n, to Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch, Apr. 1, 2003, reprintedat 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 346, 347 (2003); Letter from Law
Professors to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch & Sen. Patrick Leahy, Apr. 2, 2003, reprintedat 15 FED.
SENT'G REP. 346, 351 (2003).
130 John Gibeaut, Opening Sentences: While the Feeney Amendment's Tightening of
Federal Guidelines Has Judges Steaming, States Are Moving to Loosen Up Strict Regimes,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 2004, at 55, 56 (quoting Rep. Feeney); see also Judges in the Cultural Wars
Crossfire, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 48 (comment by Rep. Feeney on regulating federal court
jurisdiction).
131 ABBOTT, supranote 2, at 61.
132 Id. at 5, 96-98, 112.

133 Asimov, supranote 21, at vii.
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In the final part of his chronicle of Flatland, which opens at the dawn
of the third millennium, A. Square recounts his visitation by a sphere
preaching "the Gospel of the Three Dimensions."'' 34 This globe-like
character lifts the humble narrator out of Flatland to reveal other worlds
beyond the two-dimensional. Although initially frightened that what he
sees is either "madness or it is hell," A. Square is calmly informed that "[i]t
is neither . . . it is Knowledge; it is Three Dimensions."'135 Through
explanation and experiences, the sphere's flat pupil is taught about a higher
dimension and its inhabitants, as well as the meaning of concepts totally
foreign to Flatlanders, such as "shade" and "perspective.' ' 136 And when A.
Square balks at a favorable reference to ideals such as justice and mercy,
decrying them as "the qualities of women," the sphere responds that "many
of the best and wisest" residing in three dimensions greatly value such
"human faculties" and thus think "more of your despised Straight Lines
than of your belauded Circles."' 37 In this way, the otherwise flat narrator
comes to appreciate worlds of higher dimensionality.
As it turns out, the ongoing story of Gridland has noticeable
similarities to A. Square's account. Not unlike their other-world denying
counterparts in Flatland, Congress and the Commission sought to suppress
thoughts and deeds that undermined the laws of the grid, with acute anxiety
over the practice of plea bargaining, for instance, and the attendant
possibility that a sentence might defy the rules of Gridland. 38 In response,
trial courts were bound to sentence a defendant, not only for the crimes of
conviction, but also for conduct beyond the jury verdict or plea
agreement.1 39 Under the Guidelines' "real offense" provisions, prosecutors
could allege all reasonably foreseeable behavior and other crimes connected
to "the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan"-even if never
confronted by the jury or pleading defendant nor implicit within the
conviction-and such "relevant conduct" need only be proven more likely
than not.140 In this way, criminal justice practitioners were supposedly
bound by the Guidelines and all defendants trapped in two-dimensions, thus
allowing Gridland's rulers to deny that anything existed outside their
domain.

supra note 2, at 89, 91.
"' Id. at 92.
136 Id. at 99-101.
17 Id. at 95-96.
138 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong. 63, 167 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3246, 3350.
139 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, § 1B1.3.
140 Id. § IBI.3(a)(2).
134 ABBOTT,
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But given the mechanical, emotionless evaluation of human beings
under the Guidelines, it was little wonder that some criminal justice actors
would attempt to evade the formulaic dictates to obtain just resolutions in
specific cases. 41 District courts faced with an especially heavy punishment
might massage the facts to drive down the sentencing range, and some even
directed probation officers to modify their pre-sentencing reports
accordingly. 42 But more often than not, it was the attorneys who plotted
against the Guidelines, usually by a covert deal on the facts to present in
open court. The amount of drugs or monetary loss, the dates of crime, the
existence of a firearm, and all other crucial details were negotiable in this
process. 143 Although the end may appear noble-obtaining a fair
punishment in the shadow of the Guidelines-surreptitious deals are
inherently suspicious, and the idea of negotiating facts can only undermine
44
the legitimacy of a criminal justice system and its truth-seeking function.
So in spite of contrary intentions, the severity and inflexibility of Gridland
inspired strategic deceit among judges and practitioners
as the only
45
perceived means to achieve justice in individual cases.

141See, e.g., Mary Pat Flaherty & Joan Biskupic, Prosecutors Can Stack the Deck;
Sentencing Powers Shift FromJudges, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1996 at Al [hereinafter Flaherty
& Biskupic, Prosecutors Can Stack the Deck] ("There's a certain fiction we all engage in if
we want a certain result.") (quoting defense attorney).
142 See, e.g., Catherine M. Goodwin, The Independent Role of the Probation Officer at
Sentencing and in Applying Koon v. United States, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 71.
143 See, e.g., Flaherty & Biskupic, Prosecutors Can Stack the Deck, supra note
141;
Tony Garoppolo, Fact Bargaining: What the Sentencing Commission Hath Wrought, 10
BNA CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL 405 (1996); Eugene D. Natali, The Probation Officer,
Bean Counting and Truth in Sentencing, 4 FED. SENT'G REP. 103 (1991). In a 1996 survey,
less than one-fifth of probation officers reported that Guidelines calculations were factually
accurate in most of the cases they had seen, while two-fifths of the respondents reported that
calculations were more likely than not to be incorrect. Probation Officers Advisory Group
Survey, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 303 (1996) (surveying of probation officers regarding fact
bargaining); see also Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An
Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea
Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its
Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284 (1997) (analyzing
circumvention of Guidelines).
144 Flaherty & Biskupic, Prosecutors Can Stack the Deck, supra note 141 ("That's what
makes it a sham.") (quoting defense attorney); see also infra notes 422-24 and
accompanying text (mentioning consequences of systematic deception).
145 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 77, at 365 ("The Guidelines ... have made charlatans
and dissemblers of us all. We spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting,
distorting and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result. All under the banner of
'truth in sentencing'!" (quoting anonymous federal judge)).
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In practice, the relevant conduct provisions only amplified the already
awe-inspiring prosecutorial power and helped transform U.S. Attorneys into
the real sentencers in the federal system. 146 As just mentioned, relevant
conduct was evaluated by a preponderance standard and was freed of some
evidentiary rules, providing a powerful inducement for prosecutors to hold
back allegations and evidence for sentencing. 147 Defendants thus could be
punished for offenses that were never charged and even crimes for which
they were acquitted, 148 suggesting to some that verdicts were now irrelevant
in the federal system.

149

But such was the tortured logic of Gridland, with

much of the circular class simply denying that the rules of their two-

146

The Guidelines have also enhanced the authority of probation officers.

See, e.g.,

United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1222-23 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[U]nder the Guidelines ... many of the crucial judgment calls
in sentencing are now made, not by the court, but by probation officers .... "); Kate Stith &
Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REv.
1247, 1256-63 (1997) (discussing increased power of probation officers). See generally
Leslie A. Cory, Looking at the Federal Sentencing Process One Judge at a Time, One
ProbationOfficer at a Time, 51 EMORY L.J. 379 (2002) (discussing how individual probation
officers influence sentencing in federal courts).
147 See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at 140 (discussing robbery prosecution
that culminated in a prosecutorial sentencing allegation of murder); see United States v.
Fulton, 173 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding upward departure based on proof of murder);
United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256 (2d Cir. 1992) (case involving prosecutorial
dismissal of weapons charge at trial that was reintroduced at sentencing phase to increase
punishment). In particular, relevant conduct was a nearly foolproof government weapon
against drug offenders, with prosecutors offering post-conviction evidence increasing the
amount of drugs attributable to the defendant, thus manufacturing a sentence far greater than
possible under the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1495-96
(7th Cir. 1990) (increase from one gram to 1.7 kilograms of cocaine).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997). In this case, police discovered
cocaine base in a kitchen cabinet and two loaded guns and ammunition hidden in a bedroom
closet of Watts's house. A jury convicted Watts of possessing cocaine base with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), but acquitted him of using a firearm in
relation to a drug offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Despite the acquittal on the
firearms count, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Watts had
possessed the guns in connection with the drug offense. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 149-50.
Although "[t]he notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt may give rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to...
longstanding procedural requirements enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence," id. at
169-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could serve
additional imprisonment for acquitted conduct. But see note 216 and accompanying text
(noting that Watts was undermined by Booker).
149 See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?,40 UCLA L. REv. 1179 (1993);
see also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 523 (1993); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing
and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403 (1993).
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dimensional world were anything but hard, fast, and utterly perfect, despite
appearances to the contrary.
Ironically, in the same year as A. Square's contact with a higher
dimension-the year 2000--Gridland received the first hint that concerns
from another world could openly challenge the Guidelines' strictures. This
higher dimension was the federal Constitution, inhabited by the oracles of
its interpretation, the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Apprendi v.
New Jersey,150 the Court invalidated an enhanced sentence for a defendant
who had pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. The underlying
offense carried a state prison term of five to ten years, but the prosecutor
argued at sentencing that a "hate crime" had been committed under New
Jersey law calling for increased punishment-and pursuant to a
preponderance standard, the trial judge agreed, doling out a twelve-year
sentence. In striking down the enhanced punishment as violating the Sixth
Amendment, the Supreme Court concluded: "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 5 1 Among other things, the Apprendi majority
rejected any notion that the hate crime provision was just an enhancement
rather than a separate offense, arguing that "[m]erely using the label
'sentence enhancement' ... does not provide a principled basis for treating
them differently."' 5 2 Panicked by this holding, however, the dissenting
Justices saw the case as directly affecting the world of Gridland and
foreboding disaster for the Guidelines, possibly invalidating those
provisions that would allow increased punishment in the absence of jury
determinations beyond a reasonable doubt.153 But the majority opinion
calmly closed with something akin to the police mantra, move-alongthere 's-nothing-to-see-here: "The Guidelines are, of course, not before the
Court. We therefore express no view on the subject .... 154
Two years later in Ring v. Arizona,155 the Supreme Court extended
Apprendi to the penalty phase of capital cases, holding that the Sixth
Amendment precludes "a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an

150 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
151Id. at 490.
152 Id. at 476.
113 See, e.g., id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 523 n. II (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (suggesting consequences for the Guidelines although ultimately refusing to
address the issue).
154 Id. at 497 n.21 (opinion of the Court).

"' 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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' 56
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty."'
Dissenting as she had in Apprendi, Justice O'Connor rehashed her
prediction that these rulings "would 'unleash a flood"' upon the courts,
arguing that countless cases were being thrown into doubt and an enormous
burden placed on the judiciary157-although the Ring decision itself seemed
to have no additional consequences for the two-dimensional realm of the
grid, which did not list the death penalty among its potential
punishments. 158
In 2004, however, the otherworldly reverberations for Gridland could
no longer be ignored. In Blakely v. Washington,159 the Court struck a blow
to a state sentencing scheme that appeared virtually indistinguishable from
the federal Guidelines. The defendant had pled guilty to kidnapping, a
crime subject to a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months-but as
required by law, the trial judge found additional facts meriting an
enhancement of "deliberate cruelty" and thus a total prison term of ninety
months. The Supreme Court reversed this sentence, concluding that "every
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts
legally essential to the punishment," 160 meaning that the most punishment
he could receive is "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant."'' 6 1 As before, the Blakely majority maintained that "[t]he
Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on
them," 162 although this time most folks saw the writing on the wall, err,
grid. Yet again, Justice O'Connor fretted that "the practical consequences
of today's decision may be disastrous,"' 63 assailing the Court for ignoring
"the havoc it is about to wreak on trial courts across the nation" 164including the federal courts, as she saw no grounds for distinction. 65

Id. at 609 (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)). Of course, a
defendant can waive his Sixth Amendment rights, including jury determinations in capital
cases.
156

'5'Id.at 619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
158 This does not mean that capital punishment is unavailable to U.S. Attorneys but
instead that "the federal death penalty exists wholly outside the Sentencing Guidelines."
United States v. Pava-Buelba, No. 98-1389, 1999 WL 1338357, at *3 n.5 (1st Cir. July 22,
1999).
'59 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
160 Id. at 313.
161 Id.at 303 (emphasis omitted).
162 Id. at 305 n.9.
163 Id.at 314 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'6

Id.at 324.

165 Id.at 324-25.
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In a subsequent speech, Justice O'Connor characterized the decision as
"a No. 10 earthquake" and said she was "disgusted with how we dealt with
it."' 166 In turn, congressmen and commentators alike described the state of
federal sentencing in apocalyptic terms-"chaos," "crisis," "siege," and so
on. 167 Listening to these lamentations, one might assume that the collapse
of western civilization was at hand, although I had a slightly different take:
Like the refrain from a 1980s rock song, it's the end of the sentencing world
as we know it, and I feel fine. 168 Punishment in U.S. courts had been ruled
by the formulas of the oxymoronic mandatory Guidelines, and if the
Supreme Court's ruling provided the impetus to overthrow this regime, who
was I to complain? i Viva la revoluci6n! The Court appeared to be on the
verge of a sphere-like revelation in Gridland, indirectly challenging the
mechanistic approach to punishment and possibly releasing the federal
criminal justice system from the two-dimensional world of the grid.
On January 12, 2005, the Court visited Gridland and, for the first time,
found the Guidelines to be unconstitutional, at least in part-indeed, a very
major part. 169 The work product was an oddly splintered decision,
involving two separate cases collectively styled as United States v.
Booker,170 producing two separate majority opinions written by two
separate Justices, each of whom dissented from the opinion of the other. In
the lead case, Freddie Booker was charged with distributing at least 50
grams of crack cocaine and convicted by a jury that received evidence that
he had possessed 92.5 grams, which, given the offense level and Booker's
criminal history score, produced a Guidelines range of 210-262 months in
prison. At sentencing, however, the judge concluded by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant had both obstructed justice and possessed an
additional 566 grams of crack, calling for a sentence of 360 months-to-life.
The judge then sentenced Booker to the minimum-thirty years
imprisonment-an eight-year increase over what could have been imposed
based solely on the facts proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.171
166 See,

e.g., David Kravets, O'Connor Likens Federal Sentencing Case to 'No. 10

Earthquake,' ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 22, 2004.

e.g., Ellis Cose, Reading Between the Sentences, NEWSWEEK, July 26, 2004, at
35; Lyle Denniston, JusticeDepartment Seeks Decision on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2004, at A14.
168 Erik Luna, Reprieve on Sentencing Guidelines?, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004 (quoting
R.E.M., It's the End of the World as We Know It (and I Feel Fine), on DOCUMENT (IRS
1987)).
169See infra note 179 (discussing "as-applied" versus "facial" challenge).
170 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
171 Id. at 746. The second case involved Ducan Fanfan, who was convicted by a jury that
167 See,

found he possessed at least 500 grams of cocaine, a verdict that permitted a maximum
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In the first opinion, Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Scalia, Souter, and Thomas) offered a review of the Court's recent Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence, concluding that "there is no distinction of
constitutional significance between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines" and
the state punishment scheme at issue in Blakely, as both regimes'
"sentencing rules are mandatory and impose binding requirements on all
sentencing judges. 172 The opinion then proceeded to reject a series of
claims intended to maintain the status quo of Gridland, the first being that
trial judges are permitted to depart from a prescribed range if they find
some circumstance "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission."' 173 But as the majority opinion noted,
[D]epartures are not available in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most. In
most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant
factors into account, and no departure will be legally permissible. In those instances,
the judge is bound to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range.174

Justice Stevens likewise rejected the government's assertions
regarding the source of the Guidelines, the force of stare decisis, and the
separation of powers doctrine.1 75 The fact that the rules of Gridland came
from the Commission rather than Congress was irrelevant to the jury trial
right, while no prior case seemingly at odds with the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence had ever raised the issue of trial by jury. 176 The
final contention boiled down to the idea that if sentencing factors must now
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commission has been
accorded the power to define elements of a crime in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. But Stevens denied that the label of
"element" versus "factor" matters one whit, and, more importantly, the
Court had "always recognized" that the Commission was vested with
policymaking authority and that this delegation by Congress was entirely
constitutional.1 77 With all contrary arguments duly dismissed, the Apprendi
line of cases applied with full force to the Guidelines: "Any fact (other than
a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury
sentence of seventy-eight months. Although the trial judge found that Fanfan was actually
culpable for 2.5 kilograms of powder cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack, as well as being a
criminal "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor," he refused to impose an enhanced
sentence based on the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely. Id.at 747.
172 Id.at 749-50.
171 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000).
174Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 750; see supra note 121.
175 125 S.Ct. at 752.
176 Id. at 752-54.
177Id. at 754-55.
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verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
1 78
reasonable doubt.

It was the second Booker opinion, however, that provided the
underpinnings for a potential coup d'dtat in Gridland and the overthrow of
two-dimensional sentencing. Justice Breyer (writing on behalf of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and O'Connor) was
faced with a complex question that nevertheless can be summed up in two
words: Now what? The Court had to craft a suitable remedy given its
conclusion that the Guidelines real offense scheme violated the Sixth
Amendment-and with some exceptionally fancy judicial footwork, the
majority "severed and excised" two provisions of the Sentencing Reform
Act, one that made the Guidelines mandatory179in federal court and the other
establishing the standard of appellate review.
Breyer argued that this solution was most consistent with Congress's
intent, given that lawmakers would have preferred a total invalidation of the
Act to engrafting a jury trial requirement at sentencing, but they also would
have favored the deletion of some provisions to striking down the Act in its
entirety. 180 As for the former, the Court's remedial majority contended that:
(1) Congress wanted judges, not juries, to be making sentencing decisions;
(2) such decisions must be based on real conduct in order to prevent unjust
disparities in punishment, which demands a variety of information (e.g., a
probation officer's presentencing report) that would not be available until
after the trial was ended and the jury dismissed; and (3) a requirement of
jury factfinding would not only make sentencing excessively complex but
would also (4) inject improper factors (e.g., an attorney's talents) into the
decisionmaking process as well as (5) make upward sentencing adjustments

1'Id. at 756.
179Id. at 756-57 (excising 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e) (2000 & Supp. 2005)).
Among the objections raised by the dissenters was the remedial majority's treatment of the
Sixth Amendment issue as though it were a "facial" rather than "as-applied" challenge to the
Guidelines. See id. at 771-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id.at 795-99 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting in part).
[I]t
is indisputable that the vast majority of federal sentences under the Guidelines would have
complied with the Sixth Amendment without the Court's extraordinary remedy. Under any
reasonable reading of our precedents, in no way can it be said that the Guidelines are, or that any
particular Guidelines provision is, facially unconstitutional.
Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). "Application of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines resulted in impermissible factfinding in Booker's case, but not in Fanfan's,"
Justice Thomas opined. "Thus Booker's sentence is unconstitutional, but Fanfan's is not."
Id.at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
"8'
Id. at 758-69 (majority opinion).
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more difficult than downward departures, none of which Congress could
have intended.1 81
Having rebuffed the alternative of jury sentencing, Justice Breyer
turned to the issue of partial excision versus total invalidation. "Most of the
statute is perfectly valid," Breyer contended, "[a]nd we must 'refrain from
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary."", 182 By ditching the
language that makes the Guidelines obligatory on trial courts and the
section that calls for de novo appellate review of departures from the
requisite sentencing ranges, "[t]he remainder of the Act 'function[s]
83
independently."1
Without the "mandatory" provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take
account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals ....
[It] requires
judges to consider the Guidelines sentencing range established for ... the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant, the pertinent
Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. And the Act . . . requires
judges to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect
for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public,
and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training
and medical care.184

All that was left for the Court to do was offer a new standard of appellate
review and reconsideration. For this, the opinion implied a test of
reasonableness-"whethera sentence is unreasonable"-for future appeals
and cases currently on direct review,' 85 but then suggested that traditional
prudential doctrines, such as waiver, "plain error," and "harmless error,"
86
should limit the number of cases that will require resentencing.
As might be expected from a deeply fractured decision, the dissents in
Booker covered more pages than the majority opinions combined. Justice
Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor, dissented from the majority opinion applying Apprendi and
Blakely to the Guidelines, arguing that the Sixth Amendment does not
preclude a judge from considering "the manner or way in which the
offender carried out the crime of which he was convicted."' 87 In turn,
Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas each issued dissents from the remedial
majority, with, among other things, Stevens contending that "the Court's
' Id. at 759-64.
182 Id.at 764 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984)).
1s3Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
184 Id. at 764-65 (internal citations omitted).
1' Id. at 765-67.
186 Id. at 769.

187Id. at 802 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting in part).
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'' 88
creative remedy is an exercise of legislative, rather than judicial power,
and Scalia describing the implied standard of appellate review as

conceivable "[o]nly in Wonderland."'' 89 But in passing, the always sharptongued Justice Scalia noted that "cookie-cutter standards of the mandatory
Guidelines" would now give way to individualized sentences and
review'90-in other words, punishment beyond the confines of Gridland.
The question remained, however, as to how the lower courts would
interpret Booker and thus whether two-dimensional sentencing would
actually come to an end. A small cadre of federal trial judges took the lead
on this matter, beginning with Judge Paul Cassell of the District of Utah.
Literally a day after Booker was handed down, Judge Cassell wrote in
UnitedStates v. Wilson that he "will give heavy weight to the Guidelines in
determining an appropriate sentence" and "will only depart from those
Guidelines in unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive
reasons." 9 He reached this conclusion based not only on a reading of the
Supreme Court's decision, but also on an independent evaluation of the
Guidelines regime. After listing the purposes of punishment set forth in the
Sentencing Reform Act, Judge Cassell argued that the Guidelines generally
fulfill these goals.
Congress' creation of the Commission and subsequent approval of the Commission's
Guidelines provide strong reason for believing that Guidelines sentences satisfy the
congressionally-mandated purposes of punishment. It would be startling to discover
that while Congress had created an expert agency, approved the agency's members,
directed the agency to promulgate Guidelines, allowed those Guidelines to go into
effect, and adjusted those Guidelines over a period of fifteen years, that the resulting
Guidelines did not well serve the underlying congressional purposes. The more likely
conclusion is that the Guidelines reflect precisely •what
. .192 Congress believes is the
punishment that will achieve its purposes in passing criminal statutes.

Judge Cassell then mustered a series of arguments in support of this
conclusion, beginning with a detailed review of a study finding
considerable agreement between sentences under the Guidelines and those
deemed appropriate by the public.' 93 "This general convergence between
public opinion and Guidelines sentences creates a strong reason for
generally following Guidelines," Cassell opined, given that "criminal
sentencing is the way in which society expresses its views on the
188 Id. at 772 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
189 Id. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
190 Id.at 794.

191United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005).
192 Id. at 915.
93 Id. at 916-18 (discussing PETER Rossi & RICHARD BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS:
FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED (1997)).
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seriousness of criminal conduct."' 94 He also suggested that the Guidelines
serve utilitarian objectives, finding support in a number of empirical studies
on crime rates while reiterating that Congress and the Commission are best
suited to make policy decisions regarding deterrence, for instance. 195 In
turn, Judge Cassell rejected the idea that either rehabilitation or the
Guidelines' so-called "parsimony provision"-which states that punishment
should not be "greater than necessary"' 96 --could play anything more than a
secondary role in sentencing decisions. 197 Finally, he argued that placing
heavy reliance on the existing regime was the sole way to prevent needless
sentencing disparities, given "that the Guidelines are the only standard
available to all judges around the country today."' 98 Judge Cassell then
described the sentencing procedures he would follow-more or less, the
pre-Bookerprocess and outcomes absent "unusual" circumstances. 99
Judge Cassell's opinion was the first but certainly not the last
interpretation of Booker by the lower federal judiciary. Less than a week
later, Judge Lynn Adelman of the Eastern District of Wisconsin explicitly
rejected Cassell's reasoning: "The approach espoused in Wilson is
inconsistent with the holdings of the merits majority in Booker, rejecting
mandatory guideline sentences based on judicial fact-finding, and the
remedial majority in Booker, directing courts to consider all of the
[Sentencing Reform Act] factors, many of which the guidelines either reject
or ignore." 200 In this case, United States v. Ranum, Judge Adelman noted
that the Guidelines disallowed a variety of relevant aspects concerning the
offense and offender, such as a defendant's age and employment record-a
prohibition that seemed to contradict the Act's requirement that a
sentencing judge evaluate the "history and characteristics of the
defendant., 20 1 Likewise, the Guidelines may conflict with the statutory
goals of providing for the defendant's education, training, or treatment and
affording restitution for the victim, all the while ensuring that the sentence
is "not greater
than necessary to comply with the purposes" of
20 2
punishment.

'

id.at 918.

'9' Id. at

918-21.

196 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
197Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 922-24.
198 Id. at 924-25.
9 Id.at 925-26.
200 United States
201
202

v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
Id. at 986 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)).
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), (a)(1), (a)(2)(D), (a)(7)).
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Although Adelman agreed that the Guidelines must still be considered
and that sentences outside of the prescribed ranges need explanation, 0 3
courts should not follow the old "departure" methodology. The guidelines are not
binding, and courts ... are free to disagree, in individual cases and in the exercise of
discretion, with the actual range proposed by the guidelines, so long as the ultimate
sentence is reasonable and carefully supported . .

.

.Sentencing will be harder now

than it was a few months ago. District courts cannot just add up figures and pick a
number within a narrow range. Rather, they must consider all of the applicable
factors, listen carefully to defense
and government counsel, and sentence the person
20 4
before them as an individual.

As such, "Booker is not as an invitation to do business as usual," Judge
Adelman emphasized. In this and subsequent cases, he would evaluate the
factors laid out in the Sentencing Reform Act by grouping them into three
categories: "the nature of the offense, the history and character of the
defendant, and the needs of the public and the victims of the offense. 20 5
After this analysis, giving "serious consideration to the advisory
guidelines,, 20 6 Adelman would then "determine whether to impose a
guideline or non-guideline sentence. 2 0 7

III. BooKER'S LIMITS
It would be quite easy to nitpick the opinions of Judges Adelman and
Cassell, as well as any other lower court decision interpreting Booker and
attempting to apply its precepts to the new system of advisory
Guidelines.20 8 Judge Cassell's methodology does seem awfully similar to

203
204
205

Id.at 986-87.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 989; see also United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776 (E.D. Wis.

2005); United States v. Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
206 Galvez-Barrios, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 961.
207 Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d at 776. Judge Cassell responded to Judge Adelman's Ranum
opinion in a rehearing of Wilson. See United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 127172, 1275-88 (D.Utah 2005).
208 See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Soto, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1203 (D.N.M. 2005)
(adopting Ranum approach); United States v. West, 383 F. Supp. 2d 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (adopting Ranum approach); United States v. Peach, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021-22
(D.N.D. 2005) (adopting Wilson approach); United States v. Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d
1056, 1058 (D. Neb. 2005) (adopting Wilson approach); United States v. Myers, 353 F.
Supp. 2d 1026, 1028 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (adopting Ranum approach). Moreover, the lower
federal courts have had to respond to an abundance of post-Booker questions, such as the
standards of proof and review, the meaning of "reasonableness," the issue of waiver, and the
status of relevant conduct. Although many of these concerns are critical, I will leave the
analysis to others and instead focus on the methodology used by a sentencing judge in
determining punishment. For exceptionally helpful and timely discussion of most (if not all)
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the pre-Booker procedures, close enough to wonder whether anything has
changed.2 °9 Conversely, it can be argued that Judge Adelman may have
paid insufficient heed to the consequences of adopting approaches that
Congress might (incorrectly) perceive as ad hoc or spiteful of its
legislation. 210 Moreover, both judicial approaches may prove inappropriate
in the long run, Professor David Yellen notes, as the Guidelines are "neither
as binding as Cassell suggests or as avoidable as Judge Adelman
suggests."2 '
But stepping back for a moment, it seems to me that Professor Douglas
Berman may have had it just about right when comparing Wilson and
web log, the daily
Ranum in a posting on his "Sentencing Law and Policy"
212
bible for anyone concerned about federal sentencing:
After a careful read of Judge Adelman's Ranum opinion, I am struck not only by how
distinctly the opinion interprets and applies Booker as compared to Judge Cassell's
Wilson ruling, but also by how uniformly brilliant the analysis is in both opinions ....
Congress should be very impressed and proud of the work being done by district
courts in the wake of Booker and pleased with the first small bits of advisory

guidelines [data]. Indeed, I hope Representative Tom Feeney and every other member
of Congress will read both Wilson and Ranum carefully before making any broad

statements about whether federal judges can be trusted to sentence wisely and in good
faith in the post-Booker environment.

Like Professor Berman, I find it hard to fault these jurists for their
work product. One can debate whether the approach embraced in Wilson is
superior to that of Ranum, or vice versa-whether it is preferable to hold
fast to the Guidelines as a type of judicial anchor or instead to view them as
a sentencing rudder that requires steering by the trial judge. Something
might even be said for reasonable variations among methodologies and/or
outcomes by federalizing federalism, viewing individual circuits and even
districts as pseudo-states within the federal system. Given the alleged
benefits of dividing power among local, state, and national governmentscreating laboratoriesof experimentation, letting a thousandflowers bloom,
et cetera-some intra-jurisdictional but constitutionally benign differences
Booker issues, see Professor Berman's web log, Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing law andjpolicy (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
209

See, e.g., United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371 (D. Mass. 2005).

210

See, e.g., Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-88.
Pamela A. MacLean, Circuits Wrestle With Falloutfrom 'Booker,' NAT'L L.J., Feb.

211

14, 2005 at 22 (quoting Prof. Yellen).
212 See, e.g., Laurie P. Cohen, Law Professor'sWeb Log is Jurists' Must-Read, WALL ST.

J., July 19, 2004, at B1.
213

Douglas A. Berman, Distinct Views, But Uniform Brilliance (and Results?), SENT'G

L. & POL'Y, Jan. 19, 2005, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-andpolicy/
2005/01/distinct views_.html.
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of a given federal jurisdiction (district or circuit) might be deemed proper
responses to cultural and political diversity across America. Moreover, it
can be argued that too much attention has been paid to case disparity within
the federal system but not enough to disproportional punishment between
the federal and state systems. In general, any sentencing discrepancy
among U.S. district courts will pale in comparison to the differential in
punishment between federal and state cases.214 As such, variances in
federal sentencing may not only be one of the "happy incidents" 215 of
federalism, but also a protection against prosecutorial forum shopping.
In addition, Booker could have some indirect yet very real significance
for some of the most troubling sentencing practices under the Guidelines.
"Relevant conduct" is now subject to advisory consideration rather than
mandatory inclusion in punishment, empowering the trial judge to avoid
appalling prison terms that stem from, inter alia, prosecutors piling on
evidence at sentencing. "[B]oth by its logic and by its words," Booker also
"substantially undermines the continued vitality of United States v.
Watts,"2 16 the notorious 1997 ruling that allowed an increase in punishment
based on acquitted conduct.2 17 More generally, Booker could stir a revival
of the American criminal jury-not just as a factfinder but also as a check
on legislative and prosecutorial overreaching. 218 Nonetheless, injecting
juries into the Guidelines is not a cure-all for the underlying dysfunction:
the dehumanization of federal sentencing through a formulaic, sometimes
incomprehensible process. Here are but two of my lingering concerns.
A. GRIDLAND-LITE
Whether adopting an approach consistent with Ranum, Wilson, or
something in between, all district court judges in the post-Booker world
214

See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that the

district court judge "repeatedly expressed his concern about disparate treatment between
federal and state court sentences in similar cases, but stated that the Guidelines did not
permit him to take that disparity into account"); see also United States v. Angelos, 345 F.
Supp. 2d 1227, 1243, 1249 (D. Utah 2004) (discussing disparity between federal and state

punishment).

See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
216 United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D. Mass. 2005). But see United
States v. Price, 418 F.3d 771, 788 (7th Cir. 2005) ("We join all the other courts that have
confronted the issue in holding that the Supreme Court's holding in Watts remains the law
after Booker.").
"' 519 U.S. 148 (1997); see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
218 See infra note 418 and accompanying text; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging
215

the Jury: The CriminalJury's ConstitutionalRole in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152
U. PA. L. REv. 33 (2003).
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have continued to use the Guidelines' mechanical language and rules (with
a few small changes), 2' 9 based either on a belief in some underlying validity
of the Commission's substantive conclusions or a recognition that the
Guidelines remain the only game in town, so to speak. The result is
something we might call "Gridland-lite"-less binding, tastes grid-like.
Consider, for instance, the thoughtful opinion in United States v. Jaber
penned by Judge Nancy Gertner of the District of Massachusetts.22 ° Similar
to Judge Adelman, she also rejected the Wilson approach, although
providing a more exhaustive critique of Judge Cassell's decision and a
In Jaber, Judge
detailed exposition of her own sentencing process.221
Gertner noted that "the Wilson method comes perilously close to the
mandatory regime found to be constitutionally infirm in Booker."222 She
then analyzed each of the legal underpinnings for Wilson, which "overstates
the case3 for deference to the Commission, particularly in individual
22
cases."
Among other things, Judge Gertner maintained that: the Sentencing
of
Commission "supplanted" rather than "supplemented" the justice 224
individualized punishment with pre-ordained consequences from afar;
"[t]he Guidelines were rules, even 'diktats,' mechanistically applied"; and
this formulaic sentencing meant that "if the judge finds 'x' fact (quantity,
the amount of the fraud, for example), 'y' sentence is essentially
compelled., 225 These conclusions coincide with my own objections to the
federal system's two-dimensional, mechanical approach to punishment. As
for her post-Booker sentencing methodology, Gertner begins by identifying
unacceptable approaches. At one extreme is the mandatory Guidelines
system foreclosed by Booker; at the other extreme is what she calls the
"free at last" approach, whereby judges sentence based on their own

219

See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1272 (D. Utah 2005):

Terminology can get a bit tricky here; to avoid confusion, it seems best to use the term
"departure" as reflecting its settled meaning of a difference from an otherwise-specified
Guidelines sentence approved by the Guidelines themselves, and a new term-perhaps
"variance"--as meaning a difference from the Guidelines system that is not called for by the
Guidelines themselves. The Second Circuit has suggested the term "non-Guidelines sentence"
might serve as the distinguishing term from "departure." However, that still leaves a void in that
no verb is available to describe a court's action in such circumstances-"variance" has the
advantage of including the verb form "vary."
221

See, e.g., United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371 (D. Mass. 2005).
See id. at 370-76.

222

Id. at 371.

223

Id. at 372.

224

Id. at 368 n.7.
Id. at 368-69.

220

225
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personal proclivities. 226 "Advisory guidelines should fall somewhere in227 Judge Gertner argued, although "[t]he devil ...
poles,
between these 22
8
in the details.,

is

And therein lies the problem: As long as the details of a particular
sentence will flow from the Guidelines-supplying the baselines and rules
for sentencing pursuant to some level of judicial deference-the mechanical
approach of Gridland will still infect federal punishment despite its many
flaws, a point that Gertner readily admits:
[The Guidelines) have shaped the vocabulary we use to describe sentences, and the
standards we use to evaluate and compare cases. Since there were no alternative rules
prior to the Sentencing Guidelines-no empirical studies linking particular sentences
no ...
common law of sentencing-and
objectives,
to particular crime control ..
.
.
.
229 there have
been none since, the Guidelines will continue to have a critical impact.

In other words, district court judges will continue to use game-like
terms such as "points," "levels," "scores," and so on, turning an individual
defendant into a series of numbers to be charted on the two-dimensional
world of the grid. Take, for instance, Judge Gertner's sentencing
calculations for the defendants in Jaber:
The government and the defendant agreed that a base offense level of 30 reflected the
amount of pseudoephedrine in Jaber's possession. In addition, the money laundering
charge yielded a base offense level of 29. The parties also agreed that the defendant
was entitled to a three-level adjustment for "acceptance of responsibility" under
U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a) and (b). The parties differed on: a) whether the grouping
provisions (which would reduce the sentence) of the Guidelines applied; b) the extent
of the enhancement Jaber was subject to under U.S.S.G. § 3B1. l(c) for his "role in the
offense"-two points, as the defendant suggested, or four points as the government
urged; and, c) whether Jaber was subject to the two-point enhancement proposed by
probation pursuant to U.S.S.G. §233C1.1 (obstruction of justice) for concealing material
evidence and lying to the DEA. 0
[Momoh's] base offense level was 30, minus two for his minor role, and minus three
for acceptance of responsibility. Grouping the offenses as probation had
23 1 done leads to
25 as the final offense level. His Guideline range is 57 to 71 months.

Huh? This formulaic jargon remains as incomprehensible as ever for the
affected parties, lacking any cognizable, explanatory value in terms of a

226
227
228
229

230
231

Id. at 370.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 382; see also United States v. Maali, No. 6:02-CR-171ORL28KRS, 2005 WL

2204982, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2005).
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moral judgment of the crime and the criminal.2 32 Even today, errors
continue to be made in trying to administer the hypertechnical rules of
federal punishment, 23 3 a reminder of the silliness intrinsic in the whole
Guidelines process.234 And given that the sentencing ranges persist without
any underlying connection to valid theoretical or empirical arguments, the
baseline provided by a Guidelines' punishment still lacks legitimacy
beyond whatever institutional authority exists in the naked commands of
the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
But as was true of the decisions by Judges Cassell and Adelman, it is
impossible for me to fault Judge Gertner for her Jaber opinion. Until
Congress readdresses federal sentencing, district court judges have no other
option but to play the game of Gridland-lite: apply the Commission's
formula, place the defendant on the grid, and then use your considered
judgment to determine a just punishment. Certainly, conscientious judges
will do their best in a post-Booker world to explain a sentence and its
justification in terms that are comprehendible to the defendant, victims and
other concerned parties, and the public 235-but

232

any success in this endeavor

To be fair, Judge Gertner's Jaber opinion provided a lucid, context-specific

discussion of the reasons for imposing particular sentences. See Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d at
367-83.
233 See United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 488 (1st Cir. 2005) (reversing
sentence because judge and pre-sentence report relied upon the
Guidelines); United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 800 (6th
sentence because judge miscalculated the Guidelines range); see
Davila, 418 F.3d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir. 2005) (reversing sentence
consult Guidelines).
234 Judge Josd Cabranes aptly described the Guidelines as

wrong edition of the
Cir. 2005) (reversing
also United States v.
for judge's failure to

a kind of Rube Goldberg-like system . . in which no one who participates in it can reasonably
know what is going on during a sentencing hearing-least of all a criminal defendant, who you
would have imagined should come out of a sentencing hearing with a very clear idea of what has
gone on.
Proceedings of the Fifty-First Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit and
Criminal Procedure, and Rules Governing Section 2255, 134 F.R.D. 321, 475 (1991)
(comments of Judge Cabranes).

Nothing is more disconcerting to me as a District Judge than to watch a defendant and his family
and others sitting in a courtroom, literally bewildered by 30 to 60 minutes of conversations about
matrices, computations, adding, deducting, excluding, including, departing, not departing. This
is not justice and the federal district judges in this country know that and no amount of pseudoscience, no amount of technology introduced into this process, is going to alter this fact.
Id.; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at 84.
235

See, e.g., supra note 232.
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will be due to the acumen of the jurist, not the sensibility of the
Guidelines. 36
B. MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Unfortunately, the incremental benefits of Booker will likely have no
impact on the most oppressive dictates of Gridland: mandatory minimum
sentencing laws.237 These statutes demand a high baseline of punishment
for those who commit certain offenses and were incorporated into the
Guidelines by simply shifting up the relevant sentencing range to
correspond with the obligatory punishment. Because mandatory minimums
do not involve any post-conviction judicial factfinding, the Supreme
Court's evolving Sixth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to pose no
obstacle to the imposition of sometimes excessive punishment; so long as
the jury found to be true the facts triggering a mandatory sentence, the
defendant may find no relief under Booker, its antecedents, or its progeny.
Frequently wielded in drug- or gun-related crimes, mandatory
minimums take the mechanical methodology of the Guidelines to an
extreme form of syllogistic punishment. For instance, if one is found guilty
of possessing more than five grams of crack cocaine, then he must be
sentenced to at least five years imprisonment; Defendant X was found
guilty of possessing more than five grams of crack cocaine; thus, Defendant

236

See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he sentencing

judge can discuss the application of the statutory factors to the defendant not in checklist
fashion but instead in the form of an adequate statement of the judge's reasons, consistent
with section 3553(a), for thinking the sentence that he has selected is indeed appropriate for
the particular defendant."); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 2005)
("Judges need not rehearse on the record all of the considerations that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
lists; it is enough to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence lies
outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.").
237 It should be noted that in one recent case Judge Adelman refused to impose an
obligatory sentence on a crack cocaine offender, arguing that the 100:1 crack-powder ratio
was unjustifiable and issuing a sentence pursuant to the federal system's governing law (18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (Supp. 2005)) rather than the mandatory minimum statute (21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(l)(A) (1999 & Supp. 2005)). See United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771 (E.D.
Wis. 2005); see also Simon v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); United
States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005). Unfortunately, this type of Booker-based
sentence reduction below a statutory mandatory minimum term of incarceration seems
unlikely to survive appeal. Cf United States v. Gibson, No. 05-10251, 2005 WL 2249891,
at *2 (11 th Cir. Sept. 16, 2005) (concluding that Booker "does not undermine the validity of
minimum mandatory sentences, at least not where the enhanced minimum does not exceed
the non-enhanced maximum") (quoting Spero v. United States, 375 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
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X must be sentenced to at least five years imprisonment. 38 The offender's
personal background, the facts of his case, and all other details become
irrelevant under mandatory minimums. Indeed, much of the world created
by these heavy-handed sentences is not composed of two dimensions but
only one-the presence or absence of some fact-and thus resembles the
linear realm of "Lineland" that appeared to A. Square in a dream. 39
Admittedly, there is a certain pedigree to federal mandatory minimum
sentences, having existed throughout the nation's history. Congress enacted
the first batch of mandatory minimums in 1790, requiring life sentences for
first-degree murder and piracy and ten years imprisonment for causing a
ship to run aground by using a false light. 240 New obligatory punishments
have been added over the ensuing two centuries, from a minimum onemonth sentence for refusal to testify before Congress, to at least twenty
years imprisonment for selling a child into sexual slavery. 241 According to
a highly respected federal report issued in 1991,242 there were
approximately 100 mandatory minimum provisions spread throughout sixty
statutes in the U.S. Code.243 But the report was quick to note that both the
sheer quantity and history of such statutes could be deceptive. Until the
final few decades of the twentieth century, mandatory minimums were
rarely enacted
and only addressed discrete issues rather than entire classes
24 4
of crime.

238

21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000); see, e.g., Julie Stewart, The Effects of Mandatory Minimums

on Families and Society, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 37, 38 (1999).
239 See ABBOTT, supra note 2, at 61-74. In his vision of Lineland, A. Square confronted
a one-dimensional realm where "the small Lines were men and the Points women," all of
them "confined in motion and eye-sight to that single Straight Line, which was their World,"
and "the whole of their horizon ... limited to a Point." Id. at 63. It should be noted,
however, that some mandatory minimum sentences are triggered by the conjunction of
current and prior convictions.
240 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000) (first-degree murder); id §§ 1651-53, 1655 (piracy); id.
§ 1658 (causing vessel to run aground by using false light); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM app. A (1991) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT] (listing

statutory provision requiring mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment).
241 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2000) (refusal to testify before Congress); 18 U.S.C. § 2251A
(knowingly selling or transferring custody of a minor for sexual exploitation). See generally
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 240, at app. A.
242 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 128, at 1265 (calling the report "superb"); Tonry,
Mandatory Minimum Penalties,supra note 68, at 129 (lauding report). It should be noted,
however, that the report made the "Freudian slip" of also referring to the Guidelines as
"mandatory." See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 240, at ii.
243 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 240, at 11.
244 Id. at 6.
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Moreover, only a handful of such statutes have been used with any
degree of frequency, with four laws accounting for ninety-four percent of
all mandatory minimum cases-and as any federal practitioner or
researcher would surely know, these regularly used mandatory minimums
involve a pair of topics, drugs and guns. 245 To be clear, however, the
seemingly limited scope of mandatory minimum statutes in no way reduces
their influence on criminal justice. Drug crime dominates the federal
docket, while nearly half of all federal offenses involve drugs, guns, or
both.24 6 Of the 26,023 drug offenders sentenced in 2003, sixty percent
24
(15,504) received mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. 4 Today,
well more than fifty percent of the federal inmate population is incarcerated
for drug crime-a statistic that has remained true for a decade and a
half248-while both drug and firearms offenders serve an average prison

sentence of about 6 /2 years.249
The advent of harsh punishment for drug and gun violations can be
traced to a series of federal statutes that, with each new bill, increased the
attached sentence and/or applicability of mandatory minimums. In 1986,
for instance, Congress created a regime of mandatory minimum sentences
of five or ten years imprisonment based on the type and amount of drug
involved,25 0 and two years later it expanded the framework by, inter alia,
making inchoate drug crimes subject to mandatory minimums and adding a
twenty-year sentence for drug-related "continuing criminal enterprises. 25 1
The former legislation produced the previously mentioned 100:1 ratio of
powder to crack cocaine penalties, with a defendant convicted of trafficking
500 grams of powder receiving the same punishment as someone sentenced
for trafficking just five grams of crack, while the 1988 statute made simple
possession of this small quantity of crack cocaine subject to a five-year
mandatory sentence. Since then, Congress has passed other stiff penalties
245

Id. at 11.

The four statutes were 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (firearm possession

during drug offense or crime of violence); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (manufacture and
distribution of controlled substances); id. § 844 (possession of controlled substances); and id.
§ 960 (importation of controlled substances).
246 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS (2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2004)
[hereinafter 2002 SOURCEBOOK); see also SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 240, at 12 (noting that
"nearly 60,000 cases have been sentenced under federal statutes with mandatory minimum
provisions" between 1984 and 1991).
247 FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra 246, at
248 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra 246, at 516 tbl.6.54.
249
250
251

88 tbl.43.

See FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra note 246, at 32 tbl.14, 34 fig.E.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).

2005] ALLEGORICAL CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

69

for drug crimes, such as mandatory minimums for trafficking in
methamphetamine. 252 A similar ratcheting up of punishment can be seen in
federal firearms offenses-in particular, the mandatory sentences required
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a commonly employed gun provision. The
punishment for using a firearm during a drug offense or crime of violence
has expanded from no mandatory sentence, to an obligatory one-year term

of imprisonment,

to a five-year

mandatory

minimum

sentence. 253

Subsequent violations now result in twenty-five year sentences, 254 with each
violation to be served consecutively, and legislation passed in 1998

amended the statute to require five years incarceration for possessing (as
compared to "brandishing" or "discharging") a firearm during a predicate
offense.
Moreover, it appears that the congressional passion for
mandatory minimums in this area has yet to wane, as a number of pending
bills would further increase the reach and concomitant punishment for
federal crime.256
Since their advent, mandatory minimums have been assailed by
257
members of the judiciary as thoroughly
unjust and unwise,
including
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. 258 At various times in their careers, the

252 See Methamphetamine Trafficking Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2671 (1998).
253 See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 240, at 12. Higher mandatory minimums apply to

more dangerous weapons, such as a thirty-year sentence for using or carrying a machinegun.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(B)(ii) (2000).
254

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i).

255

Act to Throttle Criminal Use of Guns, Pub. L. No. 105-386, § l(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469

(1998). Brandishing a firearm during the predicate offense results in a seven-year mandatory
prison term, while discharging the weapon produces a ten-year minimum sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(C)(ii),(iii).
See, e.g., Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and
Child Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. (2005); Gang Deterrence and
Community Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1279, 109th Cong. (2005); Gang Prevention and
Effective Deterrence Act of 2005, S. 155, 109th Cong. (2005). For a critique of H.R. 1528,
the so-called "Sensenbrenner Bill," see Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54
AM. U. L. REv. 703, 742-45 (2005) [hereinafter Luna, Overcriminalization]. For criticism of
the so-called "Gangbuster Bills," H.R. 1279 and S. 155, see Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, Gangs, http://www.nacdl.org/Gangs (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
257 Cf Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILLANOVA L. REv. 753, 799-802 nn.218-29
(2002) (providing citations to judicial criticisms of drug-related sentences); John S. Martin,
Jr., Editorial, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31 (op-ed by federal
judge who resigned his position due to "the distress I feel at being part of a sentencing
system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid").
258 See David B. Kopel, Prison Blues: How America's Foolish Sentencing Policies
EndangerPublic Policy, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS, May 17, 1994, at 18 (quoting address by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist), available at https://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa208.html; Justice Stephen Breyer, Speech Before the University of Nebraska College of Law
256
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past three U.S. Presidents have also doubted the wisdom of long mandatory
sentences, 59 while prominent federal lawmakers and even a former U.S.
Drug Czar and a former U.S. Attorney General have disputed the efficacy
and justice of mandatory minimums. 260 Likewise, numerous organizations
have expressed opposition to mandatory minimums, with, for instance, a
2004 American Bar Association report calling for the repeal of mandatory
minimum sentencing laws. 26 1 Among other things, the critics have pointed
out that the mechanical nature of mandatory minimums can produce "cliff'
effects in punishment, whereby an individual who possesses 5.01 grams of

crack cocaine must serve the five-year mandatory prison term, for instance,
but someone who has, say, 4.99 grams of the same drug can be incarcerated
for no more than one year. 262
In addition, mandatory minimums
(sometimes coupled with liability expanding doctrines like attempt and
conspiracy) permit low-level offenders to receive the same (or disturbingly
similar) punishment as drug kingpins and violent criminals.2 63 Worse yet,
because the bit players in a criminal scheme may have no one to "rat out,"
they may be subject to severe punishment while major operators avoid hard

(Nov. 18, 1998), available at http://www.ussguide.com/members/memos/Breyer.html;
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-0903.html.
259 See Frank Davies, Drug Czar Vacancy Exposes Policy Divide in GOP,
MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 23, 2001, at A29 (quoting CNN interview of President-elect George W.
Bush); Press Release, Clinton Foundation, Interview of the President by Rolling Stone
Magazine (Dec. 7, 2000) (comments of President William J. Clinton), available at
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/120700-president-interviewed-by-rolling-stonemagazine-a.htm; 116 CONG. REC. H33314 (1970), reprinted in 3 FED. SENT'G. REP. 108
(1990) (comments of then-Congressman George H.W. Bush).
260 See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Searchfor a Certain and
Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 192-95 (1993); Timothy Egan,
The Nation: Hard Time; Less Crime, More Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, § 4, at 16
(quoting former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese); Christopher S. Wren, Public Lives: A
Drug Warrior Who Would Rather Treat Than Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at A12
(quoting former U.S. Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey).
261 See AM. BAR ASS'N JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM'N, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO
ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 26 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/kennedy/JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.pdf.
262 See, e.g., SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 240, at 29-30; Statement of Vice-Chair John R.
Steer on Drug Sentencing Policy and Trends before the House Governmental Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, 12 FED. SENT'G.
THE

REP. 347, 354 (2000).
263 See, e.g., Mary Price, Mandatory Minimums in the Federal System, HUM. RTS.,
Winter 2004, at 8, 9 (discussing "tariff effect" of mandatory minimums); SPECIAL REPORT,

supra note 240, at 26-29.
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time by providing information to federal prosecutors.264 Given these and
other flaws, former U.S. District Court Judge John Martin offered this terse
but accurate assessment of mandatory minimums: "They are cruel, unfair, a
waste of resources, and bad law enforcement policy. Other than that they
265
are a great idea.,
Yet mandatory minimum sentences remain on the books, due in large
part to the "pathological politics,, 266 of federal sentencing law. Lawmakers
in Congress have every motivation to support ruthless punishment in the
form of new mandatory minimums, which have a "tough on crime,"
bumper-sticker quality that makes them easy to understand by the voting
public, thus providing terrific campaign material for the next election
cycle.267 Federal law enforcement also has every incentive to support
draconian sentencing laws; by raising the potential punishment to
astronomical levels, prosecutors are provided a sledgehammer that often
leaves the accused little choice but to accept a plea bargain, thereby leading
to more and easier convictions.26 8 "This is the essential key to an
understanding of federal sentencing policy today," one district court opined
with brilliant honesty,
the Department [of Justice] is so addicted to plea bargaining to leverage its law
enforcement resources to an overwhelming conviction rate that the focus of our entire
criminal justice system has shifted far away from trials and juries and adjudication to
a massive
system of sentence bargaining that is heavily rigged against the accused
2 69
citizen.

When individuals demand their day in court or plea negotiations fail, "the
govemment routinely imposes a stiff penalty
upon defendants who exercise
their constitutional right to trial by jury. ',270 The end result can be the
mechanical imposition of a long obligatory sentence on an individual whose
crime and personal history call for more lenient treatment.
264

See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, The Effects of the "Safety Valve" Amendment on

Length of Imprisonment for Cocaine Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders: Mitigating the
Effects of Mandatory Minimum Penalties and Offender's Ethnicity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 401,

408 (2002).
265 John S. Martin, Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18
ETHICS& PUB. POL'Y 311, 317 (2004).

NOTRE DAME J.L.

266 See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.

505, 530 (2002).
267

See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization,supra note 256, at 719-20; Stuntz, supra note

266, at 530; see also Kopel, supra note 258 (quoting address by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist).
268

See, e.g., Luna, Overcriminalization,supra note 256, at 723-24; Stuntz, supra note

266, at 533-39.
269 United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004).
270 Id. at 264.
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Some lawmakers have claimed that truly shocking sentences are the
exception, with mandatory minimums producing only a few "horror
stories." 2 7 1 But those with real experience in federal courthouses know
otherwise; in responding to such congressional pooh-poohs, Judge Vincent
Broderick "respectfully submit[ted] that the mandatory minimum system in
place is itself the 'horror' story .... [M]andatory minimums are the major

obstacle to the development of a fair, rational, honest, and proportional
federal criminal justice sentencing system.' '272 In fact, instances of
excessive punishment via federal mandatory minimums abound, from lowlevel street dealers lacking information or more serious offenders to snitch
on, to girlfriends tangentially involved in their significant others' drug
schemes, to defendants hammered with brutal sentence enhancements
because they possessed a firearm somewhere in their home.2 73 In the words
of one U.S. Attorney, cooperating with law enforcement is "the only ticket
to freedom' 274 in a mandatory minimum case. If a defendant refuses to play
ball with prosecutors and asks for his day at trial, or if he simply has no
information to provide federal agents, his fate is all but sealed by a
predetermined statutory formula-a five-year, ten-year, or even longer term
of imprisonment-irrespective of all else, including the best judgment of
the sentencing court. So whatever the benefits of Booker, the very worst
rules of Gridland remain in effect.
IV. MORAL JUDGMENT IN SENTENCING

With the foregoing in mind, I fully appreciate the concerns that
animated Judge Cassell's thoughtful decision in Wilson. "Should the courts
fail to carry out congressional will, there should be little doubt what will
follow," Cassell wrote. "Congress can easily implement its desired level of
punitiveness in the criminal justice system, through such blunderbuss
devices as mandatory minimum sentences. '7 v Such threats have already
been leveled,27 6 and in recent times judges who disputed the efficacy and
271 See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 258, at 22 (discussing opinions of then-Rep. Charles

Schumer).
272
273

See, e.g., id.
(quoting Judge Broderick).
See, e.g., Families Against Mandatory

Minimums,

Profiles

of Injustice,

http://www.famm.org/sipoi-main.htm (providing case examples); Gerard E. Lynch,
Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547 (2001) (district court judge discussing
one case example and providing citations to others).
274 Robert F. Howe, Drug Sentencing Faulted; Benefits for Snitches Leave Some Out in
Cold, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1991, at D4.
275 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1287-88 (D. Utah 2005).
276 See, e.g., Hearing on FederalSentencing Guidelines, supra note 5, at 3 (comments of
Sen. Hatch) ("[I]t is possible that some here in Congress may respond by creating new
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justice of federal sentencing have been threatened with removal.2 77 "The
judges need to be intimidated," Rep. Tom DeLay once said, "If they don't

behave, 'we're going to go after them in a big way.' 278 A House taskforce
was even set up to examine legal opinions for examples of "judicial abuse."
According to Rep. DeLay, Congress was "putting America's judges on
alert: We are watching you.' 279 With the likes of DeLay, Feeney, and

others on the prowl, a broad swath of Congress stands ready to protect the
American people from those sneaky judges. After all, what does the
judiciary think it is-an independent branch of government or something?
H.L. Mencken once quipped that the goal of the political class is "to keep

the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by
menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary. 28 0
Along these lines, we can rest assured that certain officials will never cower

from an opportunity to score easy points against a group lacking access to
the bully pulpit like the federal judiciary. Such diatribes only damage the
reputation of the "least dangerous" 28 I branch-least dangerous, that is, to
the politician, whose harangue is unlikely to be countered by the typical
media-reticent jurist.
Sadly, it appears that the persistent attacks on the judiciary have made
an impression on the public. According to a recent A.B.A. survey, around
half of the respondents agreed with comments by congressmen disparaging
the courts. 282 But as a scholar without political pretensions or Article III

mandatory minimum penalties to compensate for the unfettered discretion. The House
already has legislation pending that would do exactly that.").
277 See, e.g., Marc 0. DeGirolami, CongressionalThreats of Removal Against Federal
Judges, 10 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 111 (2005).
278 Joan Biskupic. Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism'; Conservatives Block
Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at Al
(quoting Rep. DeLay); cf Martha Neil, Cases & Controversies:Some Decisions Are All the
Rage-Literally, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 38; Judges in the Cultural Wars Crossfire, supra
note 130, at 48.
279 Todd J. Gillman, GOP Group Plans to Turn up Scrutiny on FederalJudges, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2003, at 9A.
280

See

BARTLEBY.COM, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (1989),

available at http://www.bartleby.com/73/1421.html.
2' See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &

James McClellan eds., 2001).
282 One representative claimed that judicial activism had "reached a crisis" where
"[j]udges routinely overrule the will of the people, invent new rights and ignore traditional
morality," and the other lawmaker described judges as "arrogant, unaccountable, and out-ofcontrol." See Martha Neil, Halfof U.S. Sees 'JudicialActivism Crisis,' A.B.A. J., Sept. 30,
2005, availableat http://www.abanet.org/joumal/redesign/s30survey.html. It should be kept
in mind, however, that the same week that the A.B.A. study was released, a poll found that
only 40% of Americans approve of the performance by the President and a mere 32%
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reservations, I can ignore the blather of demagogues and ethically
challenged lawmakers 28 3 and utter what few federal judges would dare say:
The Guidelines are at best nonsensical and at worst an affront to real justice
(as compared to its formalistic counterfeit). The mechanical methodology
anesthetizes the system, its participants, and even the public to the
inherently moral judgment involved in punishing another human being with
the imprimatur of the state.
To be sure, the notion and import of moral judgment is highly
contested, implicating difficult questions of both substance and procedure,
many of which have beleaguered history's great philosophers.
For
example, theories of distributive justice attempt to address the justification
for imposing a criminal sanction in the first place, as well as the type and
amount of punishment for various forms of harmful wrongdoing. In turn,
procedural justice theories focus on the process by which a sentence is
reached, incorporating concerns like notice, representation, opportunity to
be heard, and so on. Other theories tackle specific issues and sometimes
transcend the substance-procedure divide; restorative justice, for instance,
contains distributive aspects regarding the substantive outcomes for
particular participants (e.g., crime victims) and procedural elements relating
to the means by which ultimate judgments are reached.28 4 The potential
conflicts among punishment theories are limited only by the imagination,
while any agreement on the outcome of a specific case will still flow from
very distinct premises. Over time, "much of the dispute over punishment
has to do with what factors related to punishment theorists find to be
important," Professor Herbert Morris suggested, "and with respect to
importance there is no decision procedure that can, I believe, generally
resolve the matter. ' '285 For Morris and others, it can be equally unsettling
that "among individuals apprised of all the relevant facts, apparently
intractable differences
arise over what can and cannot serve as a
28 6

justification.

Given the long, intense debate over punishment philosophy, a broad
consensus on any one theory proves unlikely. 287 Consider a just-deserts
approve of Congress's performance.

Marcus Mabry, Finding His Floor, NEWSWEEK

ONLINE, Oct. 2, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9553533/site/newsweek/.

283 See, e.g., Philip Shenon & Carl Hulse, DeLay is Indicted in Texas Case and Forfeits
G.O.P.House Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at Al.
284 See infra text accompanying note 419 (discussing restorative justice).
285 Herbert Morris, ConcludingRemarks: The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REv.

1927, 1930 (1999).
286 Id.
287 See, e.g., id at 1931 ("Whatever the explanation for this familiar and unresolved
dispute over punishment and its justification, it would be unduly optimistic to predict
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retributivist who begins by listing behaviors and attached mental states that
deserve punishment, ranking each ordinally, with, for example, homicide
invariably deemed more serious than petty theft. He might then assign an
absolute punishment for each crime-the cardinal desert-assisted by the
ordinal ranking of offenses.28 8 Easy enough, right? Professor David
Dolinko offers a straightforward challenge to the very idea of ordinal
desert: "Try, for instance, to rank the following crimes in order of their
'seriousness': attempted residential burglary, trading stock on inside
information, negligent vehicular homicide, bribing a mine-safety inspector,
possessing an ounce of cocaine, and burning a cross on the lawn of black
newcomers to a previously all-white neighborhood., 289 Any resulting list
290
will suffer serious objections, and it may not be "a credible assumption
that anyone could possibly construct a precise, universally accepted rankordering of crimes.
The problem of cardinal desert, the absolute punishment for a given
crime, can be just as contentious and unrealistic as the notion of a relative
ranking of crimes. Take, for instance, the crime of rape. Is five years a
proper sentence? Fifteen years? Life imprisonment? Death? 291 What
about the sentence for arson, bank robbery, kidnapping, or larceny? The
questions presuppose the existence of a metaphysical conversion chart of
crime to punishment-a device that does not exist and never will, given the
incommensurability of the objects being compared as well as the
subjectivity and fallibility of the system's architects. Some variables in a
crime-punishment "exchange rate" might be guesstimated; for example, a
thief might be required (at a minimum) to disgorge the property or its

anything like theoretical consensus.").
philosophers.

Of course, consensus may not be the point for

288 See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 38-46 (1985).

289 David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1639

(1992).

290 Id. at 1638; cf NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 151 (1982)

(noting, for example, that "[s]ome rapes are less serious than some aggravated batteries
which are not rapes"). But see infra Part V.C (sketching possible post-Guidelines
methodology).
291 In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court held that capital punishment is unconstitutional for
the rape of an adult woman. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In 1995, however,
Louisiana made the crime of aggravated child rape punishable by death. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. 14:42(D)(2)(a) (2005), upheld in State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996). The
Supreme Court refused to intervene in the first instance, Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259
(1997), so it remains to be seen whether the Justices would ever permit the death penalty for
non-homicidal crimes.
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equivalent value.2 92 But any attempt to translate fear and emotional trauma,
physical pain and debilitation, and similar considerations into a length of
imprisonment will appear (or be) fanciful. I frankly don't know what rape
deserves in terms of incarceration, but this issue and others like it seem
irresolvable when considered in the abstract alone.
Similar criticisms have been leveled against all other punishment
theories, including retribution's chief rival, utilitarianism. Whatever form it
takes (e.g., "act" or "rule" utilitarianism), this consequentialist theory
demands an assessment of all sorts of information, much of it difficult or
impossible to accurately gather and analyze, with the ultimate goal of
forecasting the future to maximize the good of society. Needless to say,
this style of prediction can be extremely precarious,29 3 requiring speculation
on the punishment necessary to sufficiently deter, rehabilitate, and/or
incapacitate an offender and thus protect others, all the while recognizing
that incarceration involves large social costs in addition to a supreme
deprivation of human liberty. The enterprise becomes even more complex
if it includes the offender's past conduct and current condition-from
criminal convictions and other prior bad acts, to pro-social activities and
meritorious service, to employment history and familial obligations-all of
which might be relevant to the individual's culpability, his chance for
reform, and the effects of his punishment on others. The only reliable
prediction is that the whole idea of a punishment calculus will strike many
as preposterous.
As a matter of history and good sense, then, punishment has been
viewed as an eclectic enterprise, where all suitable resources are brought to
bear in court and diverse theories weigh on the legal mind. To morally
judge a defendant requires an evaluation of the gravity of that person's
crime, the costs and consequences of the offense, and the punishment
required to vindicate victims' rights and interests, safeguard others from a
similar fate, communicate social reprobation and the reasons for it-in a
general, vernacular sense, the punishment necessary to set things right and
protect society. Consistent with this understanding, the Supreme Court has
opined that sentencing issues may draw upon more than "one penological
theory,, 294 as well as recognizing the "judicial tradition for the sentencing
Perhaps the perceived fairness of exchanging one life for another helps explain the
popular appeal of capital punishment (which is, of course, beyond the scope of this article).
293 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1429 (2001); Paul H. Robinson & John
M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of CriminalLaw Rules: At Its Worst
When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).
294 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
292
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judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as
mitigate, sometimes
a unique study in the human failings that sometimes
' 295
magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue. ,
As such, moral judgment in the form of punishment may call upon a
variety of considerations, and the ultimate decision should be
individualized. One of the great legacies of the Enlightenment is the
imperative that each person must be treated as an end in himself, addressed
as a unique, rights-bearing entity and accorded the respect and dignity
inherent in all human beings.296 Even a convicted criminal must be dealt
with as an individual, worthy of respect and the possessor of basic human
The idea of individualized sentencing not only has deep
dignity.
philosophical roots, but for some it represents a right or interest within the
meaning of liberty.297 In a criminal justice system that takes seriously the
values of moral philosophy and modem conceptions of liberty, the
defendant is not an inanimate object, a widget on the conveyor belt of
sentencing, but instead a unique individual who must be regarded as such.
This point should not be confused with the claims of penal abolitionists,
who decry incarceration no matter the offense. In most cases, convicted
criminals warrant punishment, and the rapist, for instance, undoubtedly
merits a harsh sentence. But a fitting punishment in a given case demands
that the offender and his offense be judged individually, not formulaically.
Moral judgment necessarily implicates theoretical ideals of justice,
such as the rights and duties of all members of a just society. But it also
involves a context-sensitive evaluation of a real individual, his personal
background and, most importantly, the specific conduct at issue as well as a
true-life assessment of the larger community which has shaped the
individual and, in turn, is concretely affected by his behavior. Although
modem liberal philosophy stipulates that each individual is inherently
unique, this theoretical imperative also corresponds with the material world,
as two-dimensional space cannot capture the past, present, and future of an
individual and the surrounding community. Punishment theory may frame
or even guide a judge's exercise of moral judgment, but it cannot answer in
advance the untold number and variety of questions that might be raised
when considering the precise fate of a real human being.

295

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).

296 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J.

Paton trans., 1964) (1797); cf JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press 1971).
297 See, e.g., United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (D.N.D. 2003) (arguing
that the "concept of individualized sentencing is deeply rooted in our legal tradition and is a
fundamental liberty interest").
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This kind of inquiry requires, in the words of Judge Guido Calabresi, a
"sense of balance which allows one to weigh what cannot be measured. 2 98
The moral judgment of an individual, instigated by his participation in a
particular event, involves an appreciation of the broader story of his lifethe defendant's upbringing, opportunities, and hardships; his personal
characteristics, whether virtuous or villainous; the defendant's past dealings
with others, both positive and negative; his expressions of remorse, if any,
and prospects for reform; and so on. The resulting image cannot be
expressed on a flat grid, lacking as it does the capacity to accurately portray
a person with the necessary depth and detail. There are no formulas that
can convert the entirety of a person's life into discrete variables for
plugging and chugging in a grand sentencing equation; there are no
objective scales that measure the character and capabilities of a defendant,
his ability to behave with beneficence or malevolence, to feel empathy and
regret, to take responsibility for his actions and make amends, and to
contribute to the well-being of others and society at large.
Only a fellow human being can assess the myriad facts and factors
involved in morally judging another human being; and only an adequately
trained and duly experienced jurist, vested with legal independence and
fact-finding abilities, can balance the totality of the circumstances and then
impose a sentence that fits both the offense and the offender. As one
district court maintained a few years ago: "The fair method of sentencing is
for an impartial judge, who is fully cognizant of an individual defendant's
personal character, family responsibilities, medical and mental condition,
criminal record, and the particular circumstances surrounding the crime, to
impose sentence after deep reflection, informed by the judge's experience
in life and in the law." 299 The formal and practical legal education of a trial
judge, coupled with case-specific knowledge of a given individual, allows
him to discern the similarities and differences among crimes and criminals.
Just as importantly, the personal disposition of a defendant's caseconsiderate of all relevant evidence and arguments, and delivered through a
comprehensive and comprehensible statement of reasons-can legitimize
punishment in the minds of the defendant, other affected parties, and the
general public.
The Guidelines of Gridland make the task of morally judging an
individual virtually impossible, however, a predicament made clear by
Judge Gertner in her Jaber opinion. Although the U.S. Sentencing
Commission admitted "the difficulty of foreseeing and capturing a single
298 Guido

Calabresi, What Makes A Judge Great: To A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 142 U.

PA. L. REv. 513, 513 (1993).
299 United States v. Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d 41, 41-42 (D. Mass. 2001).
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set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct
potentially relevant to a sentencing decision," 300 it made no attempt to
implement any purpose of punishment and failed to serve as an expert
Most notably, the Commission
agency as envisioned by Congress.30 '
abandoned the idea of "field testing" the Guidelines or any other form of
scientific study. Instead, it "simply took the average national sentences for
a given offense, and then increased them, without explanation." 30 2 Dubious
empiricism thus combined with dictatorial rule-imposition, offering only
formalistic rationales for deferring to the Commission. 30 3 The rules of the
Guidelines exist as a matter of fiat alone, not due to their correlation with
any valid conception of justice in sentencing. Worse yet, Judge Gertner
notes, "the assumption that the Commission must have thought about
purposes-when it did not-is30 4responsible in part for the overly rigid
enforcement of the Guidelines.
Nor does the federal regime inadvertently foster any of the theories of
punishment just discussed and listed in the Guidelines' enabling act.30 5
Although the system might track to some degree the public's opinion of
proper punishment-one potential measure of "just deserts"-the
Guidelines have only a modest correlation to the appropriate punishment in
a specific case. In fact, it is not self-evident that the citizenry would
approve "mechanistically-derived" sentences if it had the wealth of
information available to the judge rather than "just sound bytes or
incendiary headlines. 30 6 Likewise, any suggestion that the federal regime
has substantial utilitarian benefits would be highly debatable at best.
Claims about Guidelines-based crime reduction tend to ignore the
difficulties of statistical attribution, nationwide variances in sentencing
policy, and the limited contribution, if any, of the federal system.30 7 Most
studies of crime-rate fluctuations ascribe little weight to the deterrent or
incapacitative effect of incarceration, pointing instead to socio-economic
factors, population changes, and other criteria bearing little relationship to
imprisonment. 3° Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that national crime
300 United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, § 1A 1.1, intro. cmt. 4(b)).
311Id. at 373-74.
302 Id. at 374.
303 See id
'04id.at 374 n.18.
305 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A-D) (2000).
306 Jaber,362 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
307 Id. at 375-76.
308 See, e.g., id. at 375 (citing HENRY S. RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSE 5, 15-18 (2003)); see also John J. Donohue III & Steven
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rates have been impacted by the federal regime, dwarfed as it is by the state
Equally far-fetched is the notion that the
criminal justice systems.
Guidelines have furthered the utilitarian goal of rehabilitation; to be blunt,
I'm not sure anyone could plausibly argue that the Guidelines have
or vocational training,
provided defendants "with needed educational
30 9
treatment.,
correctional
other
or
care,
medical
But even if the Commission had attempted to address the standard
objectives of punishment in a meaningful sense, the mechanical contraption
it formulated could not be perceived as fulfilling any of these goals. As
discussed earlier, the Guidelines are inscrutable, with judges and
practitioners experiencing great difficulties with the federal system's
unwieldy sentencing regime. It is safe to say that an average citizen
walking into a Guidelines colloquy would have no clue as to the
justifications for punishment in general or in the specific case at bar. In
fact, one need only spend a brief period of time in U.S. district court to
appreciate the surreal nature of the process and the intellectual disconnect
between those most intimately affected by any punishment and the actual
words of a sentencing hearing, demonstrated by the perplexed stare of the
defendant and those in the gallery.
Despite Congress's intent to ensure "certain[ty] about the sentence and
the reasons for it," 310 the excessive complexity of the federal scheme
virtually guarantees confusion among defendants, ordinary citizens, and
even legal professionals. And although the Guidelines were supposed to
encourage "respect for the law," 31' it is almost laughable to argue that the
tortuous dictates of Gridland inspire popular support for the criminal justice
system and its actors or promote lawful behavior among the citizenry.
Instead, after poring over "page after page of amendments, examples, and
references to other sections" in the Guidelines, "one will be left with the
distinct impression that confusions reign and further amendments are on the
way. 312 Most importantly, the sentencing methodology was fatally flawed
from the start, as human conduct cannot be reduced to a neat set of figures
chartable on a master sentencing table. 313 "[T]he idea of restraining
D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON. 379 (2001)
(empirical study suggesting that legalized abortion had a time-delayed effect on crime rates);
Mark Sherman, Crime Rate Remains at 2003 Level, Study Says, WASH. POST, Sep. 26, 2005,
at A2.
309 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
310 S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 39 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N 3182, 3222.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
312 United States v. Kuhl, 816 F. Supp. 623, 627 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
313 See, e.g., Biskupic & Flaherty, Loss of Discretion, supra note 17 (quoting Judge
").
Judith Keep) ("Human conduct just doesn't fit into a grid ....
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discretion through grids, columns, and various scores belittles the gravity of
the social statement that attends the imposition of a criminal sentence," one
district court argued. "The formulae and the grid distance the offender from
the sentencer-and from the reasons for punishment-by lending the
process a false aura of scientific certainty. '3 14
The political branches' concern over sentencing disparities cannot be
dismissed as frivolous, however. Even though the Guidelines may be
nonsensical, at least the rules apply equally to every defendant and provide,
if nothing else, "equal nonsense for all. ' 315 Over time, equality has become
a fundamental command of liberal democracy, protected in the United
States by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence. No considerate individual supports penalizing
or forgiving an individual due to race, gender, creed, or national origin. But
beyond eliminating distinctions based on unconstitutional classifications,
the restrictions on a judge's sentencing discretion become highly
questionable, premised as they are on a myth of identical defendantspeople indistinguishable in all respects deemed relevant under the
Guidelines. These defendants receive the same sentences for embezzling
the same amount of money, for instance, or committing comparable
assaults.316
If truly identical defendants did exist, of course, it would be
fundamentally unjust to dole out disparate punishments between crimes and
criminals that are impossible to tell apart. Along these lines, moral
judgment necessarily incorporates the concept of moral equality, a
constituent attribute of any legitimate theory of justice.1 7 In its Aristotelian
formulation, judges should treat like cases alike-and conversely,
dissimilar cases should be treated differently.3 18 A just sentencing system
must thus distinguish between defendants who are not, in fact, similarly
situated, ensuring that individuals who differ in relevant respects do not
receive the same sentence. The real challenge is determining those factors
that are morally relevant, including: the gravity of the crime in question; the
defendant's history (whether filled with integrity or depravity); the impact
of both the crime and the punishment on the victim, other interested parties,
314 United States v. Reich, 661 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
315See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less

Aggregation,58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 908 (1991).
316 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, §§ 2A2.2, 2B1.1.
317

See, e.g., WILL KYMLiCKA,

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 5 (1990)

(suggesting that moral equality establishes an "egalitarian plateau" for all modem political
theories).
318 Cf ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans., Oxford University
Press 1998) (1925).
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and the community; the defendant's potential for reform or recidivism; and
so on. At the outset, people will differ on exactly how each factor should
But the
be analyzed and weighed in a sentencing decision. 31 9
incommensurability of facts and values coupled with the uniqueness of each
case counsels against the institution of rigid formulas and the mandatory
inclusion or exclusion of information about the crime and the criminal
(other than constitutionally banned factors like race). The historical
solution, as just discussed, was to permit a trial judge to consider all reliable
evidence bearing on the crime and its context, the defendant's culpability,
and the consequences for concerned parties and society at large. 320 Genuine
legislative, administrative, or appellate guidance might assist in this
important task, but hard-and-fast rules tend to impede moral judgment in
the form of punishment.
The Guidelines, however, diverge from the historical and
philosophical perspective, providing only a thin conception of equality,
privileging a few criteria-most notably, the offense of conviction and the
defendant's criminal history-to be inserted into the sentencing equation
and charted on the grid. The federal scheme treats equally defendants
convicted of a particular offense with a particular criminal history score,
presuming that these individuals and crimes are morally alike, more or less,
and that equal punishment means equal justice. The Guidelines thus rely on
a feat of abstraction, 32 ' with defendants purged of all individuating traits
(except a few historical facts, such as prior convictions), allowing the
mannequin-like figures to be grouped and sentenced alike. Someone who
commits a level-X offense with a criminal history score of Y should receive
the same punishment as another level-X offender with a Y criminal history
score, or so the Guidelines assume.
But claims of justice through uniformity can be disputed by both
abstract and concrete comparisons of the sentences for different crimes and
criminals. For instance, while second-degree murder is a base level 33
offense under the Guidelines, possessing 150 grams of crack cocaine with
intent to sell is a level 34 offense. Given the large disparity of injury
319 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the ProceduralConception of

Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 205, 207-27 [hereinafter Luna, Punishment Theory];

cf PRINCIPLED SENTENCING (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992)
(collecting essays on punishment goals that discuss, inter alia, the relevant factors for
sentencing).
320 Modem death penalty jurisprudence on aggravating and mitigating factors has
produced similar conclusions. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
321 See, e.g., Luna, Punishment Theory, supra note 319, at 266-67.
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caused by these two crimes, it seems hard to fathom an equitable system of
sentencing where a drug offender is deemed similar, let alone worse, than a
murderer. 322 As for the workings of the grid, scholars, practitioners, and
average citizens are left wondering how the Commission came up with its
rubric. For instance, what makes a level 10 crime worse than a level 9
crime? Why does a level 15 crime receive about twice the sentence of a
level 10 crime? Why is a level 20 offender with a criminal history score of
1 subject to the same punishment as a level 14 offender who has a criminal
history score of 12? Why does the fact that the defendant's crime was
committed less than two years after release from prison add two points to
his criminal history score, rather than one point or three points (or five
points, for that matter)? Likewise, why does the fact that a defendant was a
"minimal" participant in a crime reduce the base offense by four levels
while being a "minor" participant only results in a two level reduction? The
potential queries about the rules of Gridland are endless but the answers
have not been readily forthcoming.
Moreover, it is a practical truism that no two offenders and no two
offenses will be exactly alike.323 Human existence is multidimensional by
nature, producing a reality that constantly reaffirms the adage that the facts
of life are richer than words. 324 "The complete elimination of sentencing
disparity is... an impossible task due to the differing nature of every crime
and every criminal," one district court contemplated a few years ago.
"Sentencing is necessarily subjective and must be based on the individual
and his or her crime. ' 0 25 To demonstrate the problem of uniformity by
abstraction under the Guidelines, consider a relatively uncomplicated
hypothetical of defendants who embezzle the same amount of money or
commit an ostensibly similar assault:
Alan had 15 years of faithful, diligent employment at the bank. He is universally
known by coworkers, family and friends as honest, hard-working, loving and
322 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (rejecting death penalty for rape
as compared to murder, as the latter but not the former involves "the unjustified taking of
human life"). But see Erik Luna, The ProhibitionApocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 485
(1997) (noting that a past drug czar, Bill Bennett, was undisturbed by the idea of beheading
drug dealers, that Nancy Reagan once called casual drug users "accomplice[s] to murder,"
and that the former police chief of Los Angeles, Daryl Gates, suggested that even occasional
drug users could be "taken out and shot"); cf supra note 123 (discussing whether injustice in
federal sentencing is due to mandatory minimums alone).
323 See, e.g., Luna, Punishment Theory, supra note 319, at 266-67.
324 See, e.g., J. L. AUSTIN, A Pleafor Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 175, 195 (James

Opie Urmson & Geoffrey James Warnock eds., 1979) (1961) ("[H]owever well-equipped
our language, it can never be forearmed against all possible cases that may arise and call for
description: fact is richer than diction.").
325 United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (D.N.D. 2003).
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generous. Unfortunately, one of his four young children developed a life-threatening
disease. Desperate to buy expensive medications that might save his child, he
embezzled $75,000. Alan remorsefully confessed his crime to the bank without
guilty.26
which he would never have been caught. He is prosecuted and pleads
Bob led a life of abused and wasted privilege. He has cheated and deceived at every
opportunity, abandoned his first wife and children after exhausting his wife's money,
remarried bigamously (again for money) without revealing the earlier marriage,
skipped town, and eventually landed a job with a bank where he
327embezzled $75,000.
After he is caught, Bob pleads guilty and accepts responsibility.
Carl is a young man with a strong record of education and employment, stable ties to
family and community, a wife and children, and a history of volunteerism. During a
camping trip, he got into a serious but non-lethal altercation with a local outdoorsman
after they squabbled over the boundary lines for hunting. Although Carl has a
spotless record, so does the alleged victim, resulting in a short contest of dueling
claim is discounted by the jury,
witnesses at trial. In the end, Carl's self-defense
328
which finds him guilty of aggravated assault.
Dave is a criminal in his early forties with a spotty employment record, little
education, and no vocational skills. He lacks any connection to family and
community, and instead has a history of being a drug abuser, dead-beat dad, grifter
and drifter, who provides virtually no positive contributions to society. During a
brawl on the steps of a federal courthouse, he viciously attacked another man,
resulting in Dave's prosecution for aggravated assault. He
329 is convicted after a bench
trial firmly rejected the defense theory of mutual combat.
Regardless of all else, these four defendants will receive sentences of
15-21 months under the Guidelines, 330 a result which raises any number of
questions. Standing alone, is a sentence of 15-21 months appropriate for
aggravated assault? Or for embezzling $75,000? Should these very distinct
crimes receive similar punishment? Should the embezzlers, Alan and Bob,
receive the same sentence? Or what about the aggravated assailants, Carl
and Dave-should they receive the same punishment? Do any of these
326 See United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (offering
basic hypothetical).
327 See id.

328 See Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 96, at 14-15 (offering basic
hypothetical).
329 See id.

330 For defendants Alan and Bob, the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note
72, § 2B1.1 (a)(2) lists the base offense level for embezzlement as 6, which must be increased
by 8 levels per § 2B 1.1 (b)(1) because the amount embezzled exceeded $70,000. Assuming
no prior convictions (and thus a criminal history score of 1), the resulting offense level (14)
prescribes a sentence of 15-21 months. For defendants Carl and Dave, the U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 72, § 2A2.2(a) states that the base offense level for
aggravated assault is 14, and assuming no prior convictions, the sentence also would be
fifteen to twenty-one months.
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sentences serve the traditional goals of retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation? Although arguments can be marshaled in
a variety of ways, one's moral intuition might push toward Alan receiving a
lesser sentence than Bob, and Carl a lesser sentence than Dave. Some
might find it strange, however, that aggravated assault and embezzlement
can lead to the same Guidelines range, and that these disparate crimes
committed by disparate criminals receive similar punishments. This
confusion could be compounded by considering other offenses carrying the
same base sentencing range as embezzlement and aggravated assault, 33I for
instance, or by mixing in offenders with different criminal records. But
putting initial reactions aside, the most thoughtful response might simply
maintain that more information is needed to properly evaluate each
defendant and his sentence.
Nonetheless, the Commission and its
Guidelines have already made the decision for the judge (at least preBooker):332 Alan, Bob, Carl, and Dave would serve between fifteen and
twenty-one months in federal prison. How this mechanical result achieves
anything more than equality of raw numbers is beyond me.
So whatever the impact on undue disparity in sentencing, the
Guidelines have created undue uniformity by demanding the same
punishment for disparate crimes and criminals.3 33 The federal system
accentuates certain quantifiable variables (like monetary loss) in fixing
punishment, offering the illusion of equality through numerical objectivity,
while marginalizing or even banning other information about the defendant
and his life. But although the Guidelines provide equal punishment when
certain objects are statistically equal-the same number of guns, quantity of
drugs, amount of money, what have you-this arithmetical grouping of
defendants cannot ensure moral equality: the equal treatment of inherently
unique individuals whose crimes, backgrounds, and potential are so
analogous as to justify identical sentences and, conversely, the unequal (but
judicious) treatment of unique individuals whose crimes, personal histories,
and prospects are materially different. "The emphasis [of the Guidelines]
was more on making sentences alike," one former commissioner conceded,
"and less on insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar
treatment., 334
The Guidelines accordingly operate with numerical
equality-not unlike the "majestic equality" of the criminal justice system

"'' See, e.g., id. § 2J1.2 (obstruction ofjustice).

332 See supra Part II (discussing Booker and its implications).

333Professor Albert Alschuler may have put it best: "Some things are worse than
sentencing disparity, and we have found them." Alschuler, supra note 315, at 902.
334Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 934 (1990).
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described by Anatole France 335 --offering equal punishment for those who
are not equal.
As remote entities, the Commission and Congress cannot morally
judge a specific crime committed by a particular criminal. They know
nothing about bank robberies in Ohio, the methamphetamines trafficked in
Utah, a smuggler of illegal aliens convicted in the Southern District of
California, or some first-time embezzler who pled out in New York's
Eastern District. The Guidelines can only construct broad categories of
offenses and offenders that emphasize certain criteria and dispense with
others, converting unique cases into data for relatively rote sentencing
calculations. While moral judgment in the form of a just sentence involves
an open-minded assessment of all relevant information about the offense
and offender as well as proper reflection on the valid goals of punishmentoften requiring consideration of important details that cannot be absolutely
measured or easily compared-the Guidelines "tend to deaden the sense
that a judge must treat each defendant as a unique human being," 336 thus
sacrificing "comprehensibility
and common sense on the altar of pseudo337
scientific uniformity."
Judge Frankel's dream of "a commission on sentencing" and a
mechanical punishment regime through "chart or calculus" 338 -fulfilling
the Benthamite goal of a mathematical approach to punishment 339 and
producing a Weberian sentencing machine 340 -has become nothing less
than a Frankensteinian nightmare. In Gridland, there is no clear, thoughtful,
and thorough judgment at sentencing, as the Commission has already
decided what information may be considered and how the ultimate sentence
is to be reached, erasing individuating characteristics and discarding most
personal history in order to peg the defendant on a two-dimensional matrix.
As such, the federal regime produces a "wholly mechanical sentence
computation which desensitizes those associated with it, and converts a
sentencing proceeding, which might otherwise have some salutary effect on

335 ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 91 (1894), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 550 (Justin Kaplan ed., 1992) ("The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich

and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets or steal bread.").
336 Weinstein, supra note 77, at 366.
337STITH & CABRANES, supranote 78, at 5.
338See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
339See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 77, at 365-66.
340 See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note
78, at 6, 30.
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the offender, to a mathematical and logistical exercise. '34' This is the
antithesis of the individualized sentencing demanded for moral judgment
but standard fare in Gridland, at least prior to Booker. The question still
remains, however, whether the Supreme Court's decision will permit judges
to rise above the two-dimensional world of Gridland, or whether instead it
will be "business as usual. 3 42

V. BEYOND BOOKER
Even before Booker, leading punishment theorists and practitioners
were offering various alternatives to improve the Guidelines scheme; and as
could be expected, the past few months have seen a host of proposals for
the future of federal sentencing. But for present purposes, four of the most
frequently discussed options can be quickly summarized. The first would
maintain the post-Booker status quo of advisory guidelines, permitting the
federal trial and appellate courts to interact to create a "common law" of
federal sentencing.34 3 Over time, the propriety of departures (or
"variances '344) from prescribed guideline ranges would reach a type of
steady state based on the accumulation of written sentencing opinions and
appellate review for reasonableness.
A second approach would call for the elimination of the top of all
guideline ranges, with trial judges allowed to sentence anywhere from the
bottom of the range to the statutory maximum. Depending on the advocate,
the district court would either start at the statutory maximum and work
down, or begin with the guidelines range and possibly work up to the
legislative boundary as appropriate. 345 The third option would demand that
all facts or factors underlying a particular sentence under the Guidelines be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This so-called "Kansas plan"
might well require a bifurcated process, with jurors determining guilt for
the charged crime and then deliberating on aggravating factors in a

341

Remarks of Morris E. Lasker, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New

York, Before the Symposium on Sentencing Guidelines (Sept. 9, 1997), available at

http://www.november.org/dissentingopinions/Lasker.html.
342 United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis.
2005).
343 See, e.g., Chanenson, supra note 14, at 409-14 (describing and critiquing "fully
voluntary approach"); Kate Stith & William Stuntz, Sense and Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2004, at 27. See generally Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal
Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for JudicialLawmaking, 11 STAN L. & POL'Y REV.

93 (1999).

344 See supra note 219.
345 See Frank Bowman, Memorandum Presenting a Proposalfor Bringing the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with Blakely v. Washington, 16 FED. SENT'G REP.
364, 367 (2004); Chanenson, supra note 14, at 414-21.
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subsequent proceeding.34 6 And as alluded to above, a final approach would
have Congress enact en masse mandatory minimum sentences for all federal
crimes.347 Recently, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales made
precisely this suggestion, arguing that mandatory minimums were348necessary
to prevent "a drift toward lesser sentences" in the federal system.
Forced to choose among these options, I would select the status quocommon law approach (and I would certainly offer my strongest "Bronx
cheer" for across-the-board mandatory minimums). 349 The common law
model is currently underway, courtesy of Justice Breyer's remedial opinion
and the new advisory nature of the Guidelines. The early data suggest that
the new methodology is not producing radical shifts in punishment, 350 but
only time will tell whether this approach can be everything that its
supporters claim.351 Of course, it has to be an improvement over the old
mandatory system-anything would be (except the silliness of universal
mandatory minimums). In a perfect scenario, trial courts would now use
their post-Booker discretion to prevent both undue disparity and undue
uniformity in sentencing individual defendants, taking into consideration
the host of factors relevant to moral judgment (including many of those
previously banned under the Guidelines). Moreover, the conscientious
judge would make sure that all parties-particularly the defendant, the

346

See

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 21-4718 (2004); Statement of Professor Rachel Barkow,

Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Cong. Testimony, July 13, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 84557859; Bowman, supra note 345; Chanenson, supra note 14, at
422-32.
347 See Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. § 12 (2005) (converting federal sentencing
into a complex system of mandatory minimums); Letter from Frank Bowman concerning
H.R. 1528 (Apr. 11, 2005), reprinted in 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 311 (2005) (criticizing
congressional proposal); see also Hearing on FederalSentencing Guidelines, supra note 5,
at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (noting possible response of new mandatory
minimums).
348 See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Minimum Sentences Urged: Gonzales Responds to Rulings
Against Mandatory Guidelines, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at A2; Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales
is Seeking to Stem Light Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2005, at A15.
349 See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, AG's Misguided Proposals, NAT'L
L.J.,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 30; Editorial, No Rush on Sentencing, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2005, at A14;
Debra J. Saunders, The New Inquisitor,S.F. CHRON., July 17, 2005, at BS.
350 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, DATA

EXTRACTION DATE: SEPTEMBER 1, 2005 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Blakely/PostBooker 091505.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEMO OF APRIL 13, 2005

(2005), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/booker041305.pdf.
351See generally Douglas A. Berman, Assessing Federal Sentencing After Booker, 17
FED. SENT'G REP. 291 (2005).
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victim, their families, and all other lay citizens affected by the relevant
crime-understand the reasons for imposing a specific sentence.
Still, the highly suspect decisions of the Commission remain the
default rule under the advisory Guidelines, and the bizarre, formulaic
language of Gridland is likely to continue as the dominant idiom in U.S.
district courts. My preference would be to scrap the Commission and its
Guidelines, guaranteeing a fresh start without any lingering remnants of
Gridland's two-dimensional world: end the madness of mechanical
sentencing; do away with "points," "scores,". "base levels," and all other
baffling jargon; get rid of the ridiculous sentencing grid;352 and in general,
eliminate anything that hides or precludes the inherently moral aspects of
punishment. This may all be wishful thinking on my part, however, as
many of the most influential and eloquent critics seem to concede that the
Commission and its Guidelines are here to stay. Prior to Booker, for
instance, Professor Kate Stith and Judge Josd Cabranes noted "that the
guidelines are likely to remain substantially intact for some time to
come," 353 and their comments may still be true in a post-Booker world.
But whatever the future may hold for federal sentencing, I would like
to offer a few additional thoughts that potential reformers should keep in
mind. The framers and elaborators of the Guidelines forgot (or ignored) the
lessons of the past, namely, the deficiency of formalistic, mechanical law
and its consequences for real human beings. To understand what law is or
what it should be, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "we must know what it
has been, and what it tends to become. 3 54 Another old saw suggests that
ignorance of history is a condemnation to repeat it, 355 and unfortunately,
Gridland appears to be the product of collective amnesia.
A. MECHANICAL LEGISPRUDENCE
From roughly the turn of the previous century through the Second
World War, an influential group of jurists and scholars led an assault
against the mechanical view of law that had dominated Anglo-American
jurisprudence. Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn,
352

See, e.g., Alsehuler, supra note 315, at 950 ("[T]he 258-box federal sentencing grid..

should be relegated to a place near the Edsel in a museum of twentieth-century bad ideas.").
...See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 78, at xi.
354 O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see generally THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES
(Richard A. Posner ed., 1992); see also ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES:
THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES (2000) (masterful biographical critique of
Holmes).
355 See GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON:

INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN

COMMON SENSE 284 (2d ed. 1936) (1905) ("Those who do not learn from history are
doomed to repeat it.").
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Roscoe Pound, and other "realists" challenged the then-prevailing notion of
"formalism" in law-an almost ethereal belief in a small "number 35of6
fundamental legal doctrines" that, if properly "classified and arranged,
could answer all questions presented in court through the power of logical
deduction. To the formalist, law was immutable and existed apart from its
makers, enforcers, and adjudicators, as though it had been handed down
from the heavens rather than produced by mere mortals. The resulting legal
principles were to be applied through rigid procedures that generated
uniform outcomes irrespective of the facts and circumstances of a given
case, the best interests of society, or even considerations of fundamental
justice. Inflexibility and uniformity at the expense of individual fairness
were simply the results of a "scientific" approach to law, or so it was
argued. But to the legal realist, this was nothing less than nonsense. "The
life of the law has not been logic," Holmes famously declared, "and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics."35 7
In his 1908 article critiquing the "mechanical jurisprudence" of
formalism, Roscoe Pound rejected the idea that there was some necessary
value in law assuming the character of a science.358
Being scientific as a means toward an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves,
not by the niceties of its internal structure; it must be valued by the extent to which it
meets its end, not by the beauty of its logical processes or359
the strictness with which its
rules proceed from the dogmas it takes for its foundation.

It is easy to become enamored with the mechanical approach, as
technicality and mathematical uniformity can be mistaken for ingenuity,
compounded by the tendency of some "to regard artificiality in law as an
end, to hold science as something to be pursued for its own sake.., and to
judge rules and doctrines by their conformity to a supposed science." 360 But
in espousing this type of mechanical jurisprudence, we forget that law in
and of itself is not synonymous with justice, that the morality of any given
law must be judged by the extent to which it achieves just outcomes
pursuant to fair procedures, and that an unjust law with all the features of a
science is not made legitimate by its technical form.36 1 Legal cases are not

356 C. C. LANGDELL, Preface to the First Edition of SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF

CONTRACTS viii-ix (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1879).
357HOLMES, supra note 354, at 1.
358 See Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 605-06 (1908).

159Id.at 605.
360 Id. at 607-08.

361 Pound pointed to a number of examples of mechanical jurisprudence that defeated
justice in individual cases, from the inability of the law to hold liable human actors "who
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about abstractions or a series of numbers, reducible to logical syllogisms or
mathematical proofs; instead, they involve the lives of real people, who not
only deserve substantive and procedural fairness under law, but also should
see and feel that justice has, in fact, been done.
The costs of mechanical jurisprudence are not only borne by the
parties whose justifiable claims are obstructed by formalism, but also are
felt by the general public and the legal profession. "[L]aw must not become
too scientific for the people to appreciate its workings," Pound argued, and
"[i]t must not become so completely artificial that the public is led to regard
it as wholly arbitrary. 3 62 Such a perception breeds a belief that the legal
system is nothing more than a game, rigged in favor of those in power and
against the common citizen, fostering a general disrespect for all laws, no
matter how legitimate they may be, as well as distrust of the institutions and
actors that give law its effect. In turn, the reduction of jurisprudence to a
neat set of formulas has a tendency to petrify the legal professionsuppressing independent consideration of new issues or the casting of a
fresh light on old ones; stifling the initiative of the attorney, the jurist, and
the reformer in the pursuit of a more just system; and relegating the legal
practitioner to a style of low-level technician. 363 Ironically, the mechanical
jurisprudence of formalists can only be referred to "as scientific because
those who administer it believe it as such," when in all truth, "it is not
science at all.,,364 The type of rigid, deductive methodology of formalism
had already been rejected as archaic in the study of nature, Pound noted,
"and the revolution which has taken place in the other sciences in this
365
regard must take place and is taking place in jurisprudence also."

In the decades following Pound's denouncement of mechanical
jurisprudence, the standard-bearers of American legal realism would further
expose the injustices perpetuated by formalism, debunking the alleged logic
and scientific certainty of its approach to the adjudication of human

hide behind [the] skirts" of corporations and other legal entities, to the procedural rules that
bar otherwise meritorious claims through unyielding, hyper-technical requirements of
pleading and case theory. See, e.g., id. at 608, 614-21. Also of concern were the
interpretations of the Supreme Court that deduced, for instance, a "freedom of contract"
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 616. By formalistically inferring some alleged
individual "right" or basic constitutional principle, "[t]he court does not inquire what the
effect of such a deduction will be, when applied to the actual situation." Id.
362 Id. at 606.
363 id. at 606-07.
364 Id. at 608.
365

Id.
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problems.366 For instance, Felix Cohen lambasted the courts for their
"transcendental nonsense" of technical concepts and legal fictions that
prevented just outcomes in real cases.3 67 Terms like corporate entity were
nothing more than "legal magic and word-jugglery ' 368 that provided the
fagade of scientific, rational deduction through judicial logomachy, often
with "prejudice masquerading in the cloak of legal logic, ' ' 369 ignoring the
actual consequences of court decisions.370 "The law is not a science but a
practical activity," 371 Cohen argued, and jurisprudence is not "a part of pure
mathematics" but "a study
of human behavior.., as it molds and is molded
372
by judicial decisions.5
It is difficult for those who still conceive of morality in other-worldly terms to
recognize that every case presents a moral question to the court. But this notion has
no terrors for those who think of morality in earthly terms .... [The realistic judge]
will frankly assess the conflicting human values that are opposed in every
controversy, appraise the social importance of the precedents to which each claim
appeals, [and] open the courtroom to all evidence that will bring light to this delicate
practical task .... 37

To a great extent, the critical words uttered by Pound, Cohen, and all
other realists of the previous century have been heard by modem judges,
practitioners, and scholars. American legal realism has had a profound
effect on both the study and development of jurisprudence, and it can be
seen in the work of today's law schools and courthouses. What was largely
missing in the jurisprudential critiques of Pound et al., however, was a
similar appraisal of lawmakers and their legislation. For the most part,
realists had focused their criticisms on judge-made law and not statutes or
other politically devised rules. But eventually, some dyed-in-the-wool

366 See, e.g., JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1995); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM,
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (1973); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST

FORMALISM (1947).
367 Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM.

L. REv. 809 (1935).

368 Id. at 821.
369 Id. at 817.
370 See id. at 809-21.
371 Id. at 812.
372 Id. at 845.

373 Id. at 840-42. To be clear, I do not agree with the entire set of criticisms leveled by
legal realists, such as Felix Cohen's dismissal of the American Law Institute's restatement
projects. See id. at 833.
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realists 374 and their descendents in the "law and" hybrids (i.e., law and

economics) 3 75-as well as the devotees of a new approach known as "legal
process"376 -turned
their attention to the political branches and, in
particular, the legislative function. Today, the term legisprudencehas come
to describe a still-developing legal discipline aimed at "the systematic
analysis of statutes within the framework of jurisprudential philosophies
about the role and nature of law. 37 7 This field has highlighted, among
other things, the importance of statutory interpretation, which has now
become "some 378
of the most heavily trodden ground for legal theorists and
leading jurists."

Although understandable in the modem age of statutes, this
concentration within legisprudence still concerns the judicial function, how
courts should evaluate the work of legislatures with due respect for the
duties and prerogatives of a coordinate branch of government. Equally
important, however, is the legisprudential question coming from the other
direction: What considerations should lawmakers keep in mind when
enacting legislation, particularly when it affects the primary functions of the
judicial branch? 379 Formalistic statutory law seems no better than its judgemade cousin, as mechanical legisprudence has all the potential for injustice
inherent in mechanical jurisprudence, creating the pretense of scientific
conviction by statutory formula while disregarding the unfairness
perpetrated by technical rules ignorant to their human consequences.
Unfortunately, the world of federal sentencing has failed to heed these
lessons, adopting a style of mechanical legisprudence that impedes some of
the most crucial decisions facing any judge. The Guidelines are nothing
less than a throwback to legal formalism, attempting to reduce punishment
374 See, e.g., Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950);

see also Julius Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda, 11

HOFSTRA

L.

REV.

1163

(1983).
375

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics,and the Reading ofStatutes and the

Constitution,49 U.CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982).
376

See, e.g.,

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.

Frickey eds., 1994) (tent. ed. 1958).
377 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 559 (3d ed. 2001); see also LEGISPRUDENCE: A NEW
THEORETICAL APPROACH TO LEGISLATION (Luc J. Wintgens ed., 2002).
378 Jonathan Turley, Through A Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory
Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REv. 205, 206 (2000); see, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
379 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 376, at 341; see also Robert F. Blomquist, The
Good American Legislator: Some Legal Process Perspectives and Possibilities, 38 AKRON
L. REV. 895, 920-22 (2005).
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to a mathematical exercise. Offenders are dehumanized into a series of
numbers for easy plotting on a supposedly all-encompassing sentencing
grid. 380 The process is rigid, the colloquy formulaic, the outcome
preordained. Moreover, the language used by the court and practitioners
sounds of transcendental nonsense (e.g., points, base levels, scores, etc.),
offering the illusion of logical deduction and scientific precision but hiding
the underlying value judgments-judgments which may have no sound
basis beyond the fiat of the Commission. Ironically, this agency itself
follows an administrative version of the "breakfast" rule that was so
thoroughly vilified during the previous round of federal sentencing
reforms, 38' and along the way, the Guidelines have extinguished the human
element from a core function of the federal courts. There is, in fact, no
graver judicial duty than imposing punishment on real individuals, taking
away their most prized asset-personal liberty.382
A few years ago, District Court Judge Bruce Jenkins offered an apt
comparison, suggesting that federal sentencing was like speaking with a
computer:
We forget that the computer is just a tool. It is supposed to help--not substitute for
thought. It is completely indifferent to compassion. It has no moral sense. It has no
sense of fairness. It can add up figures, but can't evaluate the assumptions for which
the figures stand. Its judgment is no judgment at all. There is no algorithm for human
judgment . . . . Contexts are dynamic. Human beings are infinitely variable,
Differences do make a difference. Categories are suspect ....
[T]here are some
things in the social realm that are of monumental importance that cannot be weighed
or measured using conventional scales, sinful hearts or feathers of truth and justice,
for example, and that the assignment of numbers to such is inherently inexact and
ignores differences that exist.

See Nancy Gertner, FederalSentencing Guidelines: A View From the Bench, HUM.
RTS., Spring 2002, at 6, 8 ("[D]efendants confront a judge who far too often, just 'does the
math,' situates the defendant on the grid, and sentences, no matter how anomalous or harsh
the results.").
381 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
382 See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 422 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2005) ("To a defendant,
the sentencing proceeding is perhaps one of the most important and grave life moments. It is
the time that a person is faced with the prospect of confinement for many years in a federal
prison, often followed by an extended period of supervised release."); see also Gertner,
supra note 380, at 6 ("Sentencing a defendant is---or should be--one of the most important
moments in the criminal justice system. After all, it is when state power confronts an
individual. With my words of authorization, a citizen's liberty is extinguished, often for
extraordinary periods of time.").
383 Bruce S. Jenkins, The FederalCourt System: For Thinking Press 1, For
Compassion
Press 2, ForJudgment Press 3, 68 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 196, 198-99 (Jan. 15, 2002).
380
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"Loud sounds the cry of 'the prisoner,"' Judge Jenkins quotes, "'I am not a
number. I am a free man."'' 384 In a criminal justice system that takes
seriously the moral questions it faces on a daily basis, the defendant is not a
string of digits or an inanimate object, but instead a unique individual who
must be treated as such.
In the end, the mechanization of punishment could not even serve the
Guidelines' ill-advised goal of eliminating discretion in sentencing. The
Commission's mechanical legisprudence creates the false impression of a
humanless process through the cold neutrality of a mathematical formula.
But as was true of mechanical jurisprudence from the previous century, the
formalistic nature of federal sentencing simply obscures the discretionary
decisions of human actors. 385 As a general rule, constricting official
authority of an actor at one point only increases the discretionary power of
other actors, often at other stages in the process. The same holds true for
the world of Gridland: By taking away much of the trial court's authority to
craft an appropriate punishment in the context of an individual case, the
Guidelines effectively vest sentencing discretion in other criminal justice
actors, most notably, prosecutors through their charging and plea bargaining
decisions.386 As such, mechanical legisprudence in sentencing not only
rejects the lessons of American legal realism, it also threatens a tradition
that predates the realist-formalist battle but would never be called into
doubt by thoughtful members of either camp: the independence of the
judiciary.
B. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The value of an autonomous court system, presided over by openminded judges empowered to ensure just outcomes in individual cases, has

Id. at 199 (quoting the television show, "The Prisoner").
385See, e.g,, United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J.,
384

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting claim that Guidelines have created a
"neutral" system by restricting discretion of trial judges, given that sentencing is "not
conducted by computers-much less by gods," and the outcomes are thus "highly dependent
on the judgment calls of fallible human actors").
386 See, e.g., United States v. Kalb, 105 F.3d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 1997) (Bright, J.,

dissenting) (noting that the Guidelines "essentially take the discretionary power to determine
the length of a defendant's sentence away from Article III judges and place it in the hands of
prosecutors who control the charges brought against a defendant"); see also supra note 146
(discussing increased authority of probation officers). As mentioned earlier, the Guidelines
have also driven the decisionmaking process underground. See supra notes 141-45 and
accompanying text (discussing artifices of judges and attorneys in order to reduce
sentences); see also infra notes 422-24 and accompanying text (criticizing such covert
decisionmaking).

ERIK L UNA

[Vol. 96

been reiterated throughout American history.387 An independent judiciary
was intended to protect the individual against the weight of majoritarian
prejudices and rash impulses carried out by the political branches, thus
serving as a bulwark against unfair treatment of the dissenting or
disempowered citizen. 388 The passage of time has only confirmed the vital
importance of judicial independence in guaranteeing personal freedom and
fairness before the state. An autonomous court system manned by
politically detached, evenhanded, and open-minded jurists is the single most
important attribute of American constitutional democracy. It is not
bicameralism or a unitary executive or federalism or any other political
device that has safeguarded individual liberty and prosperity in the United
States. Instead, an independent judiciary has provided the counterbalance
against the perceived exigencies of the day, preventing freedom from
becoming a dispensable commodity in the political marketplace.389
No matter how hard they may try, contemporary court-bashers cannot
deny this heritage, nor can they dismiss those who have championed
judicial autonomy as power-hungry jurists or pointy-headed academics.
For instance, Judge Learned Hand was known for his reluctance to intrude
on the functions of the political branches, and balked at the idea of judges
ruling society "as a bevy of Platonic Guardians. 3 90 And yet Hand firmly
believed in "the contributions of an independent judiciary to our kind of
civilization,, 39' marked by a judicial temper "which can understand and will
respect the other side, which feels a unity between all citizens-real and not
the fallacious product of propaganda-which recognizes their common fate

387

The American Revolution was justified, in part, by the British Crown's refusal to

establish an independent judiciary for the colonies. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 10-11 (U.S. 1776).
388 Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist 78:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence
of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious
oppressions of the minor party in the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 281, at 405. The protection provided by an independent
judiciary should appreciated by all, Hamilton opined, "as no man can be sure that he may not
be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be a gainer today." Id at
406.
389 Studies have even shown that judicial independence is an essential requirement for a
successful liberal democracy. See, e.g., Robert M. Howard & Henry F. Carey, Is an
Independent JudiciaryNecessaryfor Democracy?, 87 JUDICATURE 284 (2004).
390LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (Harvard University Press 1958).
391LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155 (3d ed. Knopf 1974) (1960).
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aspirations-in a word, which has faith in the sacredness
and their common 392
of the individual.,

Consider also the more recent words of Judge Richard Posner, a
Reagan appointee and one of the founders of the Chicago School of law and
economics. Although his early scholarship was criticized as supplying a
new mechanical jurisprudence with "geometric nymphomania,, 393 Posner
would vigorously challenge the formalism of strict construction that
rendered jurists little more than "potted plants," reminding readers that
"consent of the governed" was a fiction in most legislation.394 Adjudication
is "not a form of deduction," Posner argued; "understanding requires a
consideration of the consequences," and "[t]o banish all discretion from the
judicial process" would ultimately reduce the rights of everyone. 395
Likewise, my colleague John Flynn offered a vigorous response to the
recent spate of anti-judge attacks by political opportunists.

396

"Judicial

decision-making is not like a vending or slot machine where one puts fixed
facts into a machine, pulls a lever and out comes the 'right answer,"' Flynn
noted.39 7 Instead, "we entrust an independent judiciary, untainted by fear of
political retribution or corruption, with the power to make such difficult
decisions based on evidence heard in open court and398the arguments of
advocates representing opposing parties to the dispute.,
All of these arguments have particular relevance when the issue is
punishment. As a matter of history, institutional competence, and the
protection of personal liberty, sentencing has been and should be a judicial
392

Id. at 164.

393Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
VA. L. REV. 451, 481 (1974).
394Richard A. Posner, What am I? A Potted Plant? The Case Against Strict
Constructionism,NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23.

395Id. It might also be noted that Judge Posner was the author of the lower court
decision in Booker striking down the Guidelines, United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th
Cir. 2004), and he had written other opinions that were highly skeptical of the
constitutionality and justice of the federal scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 73
F.3d 161, 162 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J., dissenting).
396 Professor Flynn is not only one of the leading anti-trust scholars of the past halfcentury, see, e.g., JOHN J. FLYNN ET AL., ANTITRUST: STATUTES, TREATIES, REGULATIONS,
GUIDELINES, AND POLICIES (2001); JOHN J. FLYNN ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST (6th ed. 1983); JOHN J. FLYNN ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION (6th ed. 1985), but also an astute
jurisprude and Red Sox fan, see, e.g., John J. Flynn, A Comment on "The Common Law
Origins of the Infield Fly Rule," 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1978). I am indebted to Professor
Flynn for introducing me to Flatlandand its possibilities.
391John J. Flynn, "Making Law" and "Finding Facts": Unavoidable Duties of an
Independent Judiciary, 18 UTAH B.J. 6, 9 (2005).
398 Id. at 8.
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function. "In the long tradition of the common law, it was the judge, the
neutral arbiter, who possessed the authority to impose sentences which he
deemed just within broad perimeters established by the legislature., 399 This
role is far from an anachronism, as today's trial courts remain in the best
position to make the context-sensitive assessments that go into an
appropriate punishment. Unlike some distant entity, judges are attuned to
the environment in which the crime occurred; they have participated in
every stage of the case, from pre-trial hearings to sentencing; and they have
seen all the evidence and had the opportunity to assess the credibility of
each witness and the persuasiveness of each argument. 400 And unlike the
prosecutor, who "often [is] not much older than the defendant," trial judges
tend to have an advantage of experience that can only come with time and
the actual practice of imposing sentence. 40 '
Most importantly, the trial judge is the one neutral party in the
courtroom who benefits from neither harsh punishment nor lenient
treatment; he has no vested interest in the outcome of a case other than that
justice be done.40 2 An independent judiciary thus stands as the last line of
defense for the lone individual against popular hysteria over crime, political
pandering in the form of merciless punishment, and prosecutorial
overreaching and vindictiveness in charging. 403 But under the pre-Booker

399United States v. Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d 41, 41 (D. Mass. 2001); see also Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (noting history of individualized sentencing in
federal courts); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (similar).
400 See, e.g., United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (D.N.D. 2003):
The Court is located in an agricultural border state and regularly sentences defendants involved
in immigration and drug crimes. The sentencing judge has over forty years experience in
criminal law as a defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge; and as a judge, has sentenced hundreds
of defendants under the direction of the Guidelines. The Court participated in all aspects of the

case from pre-trial matters to trial to sentencing. The Court has met the defendant, conversed
with the defendant, and peered into the whites of the defendant's eyes. The district court is
therefore in the better position to determine [the appropriate sentence].
40 1 Kennedy, supra note 258 ("The trial judge is the one actor in the system most

experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and reasoned way. Most of the
sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the prosecutors.").
402 See, e.g., Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (arguing that "the power to impose a sentence
has been virtually transferred from the court to the government," "constitut[ing] an erosion
of judicial power and a breach in the wall of the doctrine of the separation of powers"). The
practical transfer of sentencing authority to the prosecutor undermines the Supreme Court's
previous conclusion that the Guidelines do not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). A full discussion of this issue must
await another day, however.
403Justice Hugo Black once noted that "[t]yrannical governments had immemorially
utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment," Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
236 (1940), and such concerns were not mere historical curiosities:
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regime as well as extant mandatory minimums, the real sentencers in the
federal system were the Commission from afar and the prosecutor in the
case at bar. The judicial function at sentencing often was nothing more than
ceremonial, with the court acting as a type of punishment accountant,
plugging and chugging a mechanical formula with little if any discretion.
The judge, in other words, had lost his independence and no longer ensured
that justice was done in individual cases.4 °4
For these reasons, "Learned Hand would have vehemently disagreed
[with] the federal sentencing guidelines," suggested a respected federal
judge who knew the great jurist:
Hand was far too much a craftsman to countenance so rigid an intrusion on the
discretion of a judge. "To him the writing of an opinion was a work of creation,
individual to every judge and unique to every case." For Hand, the element of
craftsmanship was the reward of serving as a judge. He would not have agreed with
the assertion that the quantity of drugs or money surrounding the circumstances of any
given crime should determine the offender's sentence. Moreover, I think that Hand
would find the guidelines rather appalling for their insistence that judges sentence
each individual defendant without reference to their individuality: their age, mental or
emotional conditions, employment record, family responsibilities, community ties,
military, civic charitable or public service, prior good works, or childhood
circumstances. 0

Likewise, Judge Hand's successors in the federal judiciary do not oppose
the Guidelines out of longing for kritarchy. It is "not that they are power

Today, as in ages past, we are not without tragic proof that the exalted power of some
governments to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is the handmaid of tyranny. Under our
constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who
might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public excitement .... No higher duty, no more solemn
responsibility, rests upon this Court, than that of translating into living law and maintaining this
constitutional shield deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human being
subject to our Constitution ....
Id. at 241. Although written more than six decades ago, Black's words appear no less true in
the twenty-first century.
404 See, e.g., Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (noting that the transfer of sentencing
authority "to the government, which, as the prosecuting authority, is an interested party to
the case," violates the "maxim of the law that no party can be a judge in his own case"); cf
Erik Luna, Overcriminalization,supra note 256, at 723 (discussing incentive structure of law
enforcement). As an aside, the disinterested nature of the judiciary is the precise reason why
the exclusionary rule may not apply to errors by magistrates in issuing warrants. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) ("Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the
law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected
significantly to deter them.")
405James L. Oakes, PersonalReflections on LearnedHand and the Second Circuit, 47
STAN. L. REv. 387, 391-92 (1995) (citation omitted).
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hungry," John Martin contends, "but rather that they see on 40a6 day-to-day
basis the injustice that results from inflexibility in sentencing.1
Moreover, the negative caricatures of today's jurists painted by media
hype and political opportunism-epitomized by the Feeney Amendment
and cries for mandatory minimums--conflict with the reality in courtrooms
across the nation, as well as the very nature of federal court appointments.
The President carefully vets and selects judicial nominees, who are then
dragged through the arduous, frequently contentious process of Senate
approval. 40 7 Those confirmed receive constitutional protection in salary and
tenure to guarantee the independence of the federal courts.40 8 Given the
high level of scrutiny placed on the nominees to ensure their bona fides,
including the necessary legal qualifications and judicial temperament, the
members of the federal judiciary are perhaps America's most trustworthy
With its extensive training, collective
and competent officials.40 9
experience, and case-specific knowledge, the federal judiciary is the exact
body that should resolve crucial issues of criminal justice. If someone is to
make the most difficult moral judgments involved in federal sentencing, it
should be an Article III judge.410
C. A FEW NOTES FOR A(NOTHER) SENTENCING REFORM MOVEMENT
Given the foregoing, any future sentencing reforms that reject
mechanical legisprudence and respect the independence of the courts will
recognize that judicial discretion at sentencing is not an evil in itself, but
instead a means to ensure that a punishment fits both the offense and the
offender. A system that sought to assist judges in the exercise of this
406
407

Martin, supra note 265, at 312.
See, e.g., United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637 (E.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd in

part and rev'd in part,728 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1991):
Regardless of which political party holds sway, the process for selecting federal judges is much
the same. Nominees are hung out like fresh meat to be poked, prodded and examined in minute
detail as to every aspect of their personal and professional lives. The first step is to gain the
confidence of a nominating senator who will conduct such investigation as he deems appropriate.
Then the FBI, Department of Justice, the American Bar Association, and the Judiciary
Committee get into the act. Only after surviving scrutiny that far will the Senate consider
granting its stamp of approval.
408 See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
409

Certainly, the American citizenry views judges as such, with, for instance, the U.S.

Supreme Court consistently receiving higher degrees of public confidence then either
Congress or the executive branch of the federal government. See, e.g., 2002 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 246, at 112-13 tbls.2.10-. 11.
410 But see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1533-38 (1989) (critiquing
the vision ofjudicial decisionmaking as involving serious deliberation on moral issues).
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discretion would not impose the perfunctory strictures of the Commission's
misnamed "Guidelines," dictating outcomes rather than assisting judicial
decisionmaking. Instead, it would craft genuine guidelines in the form of
considered advice for the sentencing judge-and once again, insights from
a previous generation of legal scholars can inform this effort. In his 1969
book, Discretionary Justice, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis underscored
that discretion is an essential tool of government but unfettered
discretionary authority can be hazardous to the individual and society at
large. 411 Instead of calling for its abolition, Davis suggested at length that
discretion can and should be confined, structured, and checked. In the
federal system, this outlook might invite a set of benchmarks for legal
reasoning by the district court, providing a starting line of sorts for the trial
judge but without a predetermined finishing line. For example, Professor
Albert Alschuler recommended a series of "recurring paradigmatic cases"
that could provide points of reference for punishment, such as "the young
man from a disadvantaged background who, yielding to the lure of easy
money, engaged in small-scale drug dealing." 4 12 Likewise, authentic
guidelines might present a presumptive sentence and justification for a
paradigmatic case while allowing federal judges to impose greater or lesser
punishment due to facts and circumstances that set the present crime and/or
criminal apart from the benchmark.
In order to make such a system viable, lawmakers would need to
establish relatively wide boundaries of punishment for a given crime, broad
enough to encompass the potentially infinite iterations of events and
individuals in real life, thus affording sentencing judges the necessary
discretion to reach moral judgments.
By comparison, the narrow
punishment ranges constructed by the Guidelines have great difficulty
accommodating the important variations among cases. Although there may
be some correlation between a given range and an abstract offender, there
appears to be little agreement between the prescribed punishment under the
Guidelines and an appropriate sentence for an actual defendant-which, of
course, is the precise judgment that must be made by a trial court. 41 3 Unlike
the fixed limits imposed by the Guidelines' "25 percent" rule, an approach
mindful of case-based variations might construct a sufficiently low baseline
411 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

25-26 (Louisiana State University Press 1969).
412

Alschuler, supra note 315, at 941; see also Michael O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity,

17 FED. SENT'G REP. 249 (2005) (advocating "a more open-ended inquiry" for the federal
system involving "specific examples of fact patterns").
413 See United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 375 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing and
quoting PETER H. ROSS & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENT: FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND
PUBLIC VIEWS COMPARED (1997)).
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of punishment for the otherwise decent, first-time, low-level offender and a
sufficiently high sentencing ceiling for the vicious, unrepentant recidivistirrespective of the statistical difference between the two-with the
aforementioned benchmarks helping to guide judges in determining an
exact punishment within the legislative boundaries.
Real guidelines and sufficiently wide statutory ranges could be part of
the common law of federal sentencing advocated by many scholars and
jurists, with today's courts drawing upon the analysis and conclusions of
prior judicial opinions. The common law model would seem to entail at
least three elements, two of which are already in effect. To begin with, trial
courts would need to give written reasons for their sentences, describing the
precise rationale for the given punishment in a manner accessible to both
professionals and lay participants. In turn, appellate judges would review
the lower court judgment to guarantee the fair application of real guidelines
or a warranted variation from these benchmarks, free of racial or classbased bias toward the defendant. The evolving post-Booker jurisprudence
necessitates both written sentencing opinions and appellate review for
reasonableness,4 14 although still employing the formulaic language of the
Guidelines. Presumably, however, both district and appellate courts could
continue these valuable practices under a system of real guidelines.
Moreover, the written reasons of trial judges and the opinions of
appellate courts could contribute to a third element of common law
sentencing-the creation of a type of institutional memory for the federal
system, where judges can extract relevant information from a database of
prior sentences. Just recently, Professor Marc Miller described the concept
of a "sentencing information system" (SIS):
Judges are provided with sufficient information to determine how other offenders like
the offender in front of the judge have been sentenced before. Judges can ask a series
of "what if' questions by varying each of the relevant factors to see how each
variation changes the sentences others have imposed. More complex systems can
allow the "what ifs" to vary over specified time periods (or to show trends) and over
different political units or groups, such as sentences by the same judge, by other
judges in the same courthouse, or by other judges in the same state or country. Unlike
sentencing guidelines, an SIS does not tell judges what they must do or should do; it
tells judges what others have done, thus allowing a better-informed judgment in each
case. An SIS allows for the development and expression
of social norms in ways akin
415
to traditional common law reasoning by analogy.

See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States
v. Engler, 422 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2005) (criticizing district court for failing to explain
its reasoning for sentence).
414

415 Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing
Information Systems, Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L.
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Professor Miller notes that this type of sentencing technology has been
adopted in a number of foreign jurisdictions, including Canada, Scotland,
and part of Australia.41 6 To me, at least, it is rather shocking that techsavvy Americans have failed to employ such techniques. Unlike the
formulaic, pseudo-scientific results under the Guidelines-rightly deplored
by Judge Jenkins as a substitute for human judgment-a sentencing
information system would aid the district court in reaching the best possible
punishment by providing constructive information rather than demanding a
predetermined outcome. Thoughtful opposition to mechanical law does not
resist the use of technology by the courts, so long as the resulting tools
support rather than replace the moral decisionmaking of judges.4 I7
Considerate reforms would also be mindful of the discretionary
decisions existing throughout the criminal justice system, not merely those
made by the judiciary. Legislators, investigators, prosecutors, jurors, and
various other actors play crucial, highly discretionary roles in the
punishment process, and any meaningful changes in federal sentencing
would have to consider, for instance, the system-wide impact of
prosecutorial discretion in charging. Conversely, it seems possible that the
sharing of advice or even discretion among decisionmakers might have a
positive synergistic effect on the overall quality of case judgments.
Although many reasons exist to empower federal judges with the ultimate
decision at sentencing, there would be nothing untoward about having a
jury remain impaneled after conviction to consider the evidence and
arguments regarding punishment and then offer an advisory opinion on a
proper sentence. Such an approach would be consistent with the letter of
Booker and the spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.4 18

REV. 1351, 1370-71 (2005); see also Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions,

108 YALE L.J. 1355, 1386 (1999) (describing the use of sentencing information system by
Scottish judges).
416 Miller, supra note 415, at 1371.
417 The real-time sharing of information and discussion via the internet would also seem
to encourage free dialogue about federal punishment, also promoting moral judgment by
sentencing judges. As mentioned previously, Professor Berman's web log has become one of
the most important resources for jurists, practitioners, and scholars in a post-Booker world,
see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text-and in a very real way, the Berman blog is
now an active part of the federal system's large-scale deliberations and institutional memory
on sentencing issues.
418 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 779-82 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part) (advocating jury factfinding); Pamela Manson, Sentencing Rules Face
High Scrutiny in Wake of Ruling, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, July 19, 2004, at Al (describing U.S.
District Court Judge Dale Kimball's use of specialized jury questions to determine the

existence of sentencing enhancements).
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The federal system might also incorporate "restorative justice"
programs which allow victims, offenders, their families, and all other
stakeholders in a particular case to enter into "a process of group
decisionmaking on how to handle the effects of the crime and its
significance for the future., 41 9 Through mediated dialogue, these parties
would attempt to reach agreement on a suitable punishment, which could
then be taken into consideration by the sentencing judge. Another
possibility for the federal system would be the creation of a "drug court," a
relatively recent innovation highlighted in a series of concurrences by Judge
Donald Lay:
In most drug courts, nonviolent, substance-abusing offenders charged with drugrelated crimes are channeled into judicially supervised substance abuse treatment,
mandatory drugs testing, and other rehabilitative services in an effort to reduce
recidivism. Eligible offenders typically have the charges against them stayed and
dropped if treatment is successful, or plead guilty with
420 prosecution deferred and
criminal punishment withheld if treatment is successful.

Drug courts in the federal system could reduce recidivism, Lay notes, and
thus "save a significant amount of money for taxpayers. 4 21
Finally, whatever system replaces the current regime should engender
honesty throughout the process of punishment.42 2
The mechanical
legisprudence of federal sentencing triggered secret maneuvering by the
trial judge and stealthy negotiations among the litigants, all the while
generating dubious "facts" and court rulings in order to circumvent the
Guidelines.
Most of these machinations were aimed at seemingly
justifiable ends in difficult cases, namely, evading excessive sentences
demanded under the federal regime. But as a recurring, almost organized
practice, this type of legal subterfuge can only undercut the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system and its actors, as the moral authority of law
depends not merely on just outcomes but also justifiable procedures in
reaching such results. "Our government is the potent, the omnipresent

419

Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L.

REV. 1, 3. See generally Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal
Sentencing: An Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 36 McGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
420 United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 868 (8th Cir. 2005) (Lay, J., concurring);
United States v. Baccam, 414 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2005) (Lay, J., concurring); United
States v. Gardner, 139 F. App'x 762, 767-68 (8th Cir. 2005) (Lay, J., concurring).
421 Gardner, 139 F. App'x at 768.
422 For arguments in support of transparency in criminal justice
see Erik Luna,
Transparent Policing, 85 IowA L. REV. 1107 (2000) [hereinafter Luna, Transparent
Policing]; Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and InstitutionalDesign, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183
(2003); Erik Luna, PrincipledEnforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 517

(2000).
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teacher," Justice Louis Brandeis once warned, and "if the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law., 423 Regrettably, the
Guidelines taught practitioners and jurists alike that thwarting the law was
bearable, so long as it was done behind closed doors and then concealed in
public with misinformation. It almost goes without saying that a legitimate,
properly functioning criminal justice system would never tolerate such
deception.42 4
CONCLUSION

I hope that readers have been entertained by my allegorical critique of
the Guidelines, although it was not meant to merely tickle the funny-bone
through the otherwise humorless media of law reviews. Instead, the
similarities between Flatland and federal sentencing help highlight the folly
of formulaic approaches to punishment. Only time will tell whether the
post-Booker world will revolt against the limitations of mechanical
sentencing or simply remain gridlocked in Gridland. If nothing else, the
Supreme Court has forced scholars and practitioners to reassess, at least
indirectly, the problems of sentencing in a two-dimensional world. For all
the above reasons, I would hope that any reforms would not just tinker with
the Guidelines but instead would raze the regime and start over,
remembering the lessons of the past and using whatever knowledge can be
gleaned from the nearly two-decade long misadventure. Of course, the real
test will be for Congress-whether federal lawmakers have the intestinal
fortitude to seriously reconsider their own contrivance.
Still, I remain (maybe naively) optimistic that someone will hear the
"Gospel of the Three Dimensions" and liberate the process of sentencing
from the bounds of Gridland. Like A. Square, I am just a writer and a
lawyer who recognizes that there is something outside of the twodimensional realm of the Guidelines, and my entreaty may be "absolutely
destitute for converts. ''425 But I join Flatland'snarrator in hoping that these
words "may find their way to the minds of humanity in some dimension,
and may stir up a race of rebels who shall refuse to be confined to limited

423

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see

also Luna, Transparent Policing, supra note 422, at 1154-65 (discussing importance of
citizen trust in public assessments of legitimacy of criminal justice).
424 See also Luna, Misguided Guidelines, supra note 96, at 19-20 (suggesting that
any
sentencing reform efforts should also examine the bloated and unruly body of federal
crimes). See generally Luna, Overcriminalization,supra note 256 (critiquing expansion of

criminal law).

425 ABBOTT, supra note 2, at 119.
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'426 There is a world beyond the grid, and it is "broad and
dimensionality.
7
42

wide. ,

426

Id.; see United States v. Sidhom, 144 F. Supp. 2d 41, 42 (D. Mass. 2001):

The Court does not delude itself that its feeble gesture of protest will be of any consequence,
except as a personal sacrifice, for the Court has always enjoyed the trial of criminal cases.
However, the organized bar, which is as aware as are judges of the unfairness of the Guidelines
in action, should raise its powerful voice and urge the Congress to abolish them or, at the very
least, to render them hortatory and not mandatory.
See also United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022-23 (D.N.D. 2003) ("Perhaps this
opinion, as an appeal for a restoration of individualized sentencing, will provoke some
thoughtful discussion on these important issues and help restore the traditional sentencing
discretion of the district courts usurped by the legislative and executive branches of our
government.").
427 ABBOTT, supra note 2, at 1.

